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excess, Button v. Mcauley, supra, for non constat the defendant
may have been a party to the same misconduct.
Thus it may be concluded from the several authorities cited:
1. That an express promise to marry need not be shown to sustain an action for a breach :"but that the promise may be implied from circumstances in the case: 2. That marriage is a
civil contract and governed by similar rules of construction with
others: 3. That the damages in such actions may be based upon
loss of the association, protection, easy life, or whatever might
be involved; and 4. That it may be given in mitigation of damages that the plaintiff would be an unfit companion and the like.
J. F. B.
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In case of warranty or fraud in the sale of chattels, the property. may be retained
by the vendee and the sale affirmed, yet his right to sue upon the warranty, or for

the deceit, will not thereby be affected.
If the vendee of an article manufactuied for him under a special executory
contract, there being no warranty or fraud, accept it, though defective, he becomes
thereby bound to pay the contract price ; but if he reject it and give notice of the
non-acceptance, he can bring his action for the non-performance of the contract ;
but he cannot accept it and bring such action; nor can he accept it and impose
conditions and sue the vendor for non-compliance with the conditions imposed.
A judgment recovered by the vendor for the balance of the price due for an article manufactured to order under a special contract, is a bar to a suit brought by
the vendee for a breach of the contract.
A voluntary payment connot be recovered back.
ASSUMPSIT upon an agreement by defendant to make and
deliver a hearse to plaintiffs. Plea, the general issue with notice.
The plaintiffs' evidence tended to show that in April 1865,
they contracted with the defendant to make, at St. Albans, and
send a hearse to the plaintiffs at Rutland, of a specified style of
make and quality of material and finish, for two hundred and ten
dollars. That defendant made and sent a hearse to plaintiffs
which was not according to the contract. That several letters
passed between the parties after the hearse was received by the
plaintiffs, and, among the rest, one dated July 26th 1865, and
another dated August 8th 1865, sent by the plaintiffs and received

GILSON v. BINGHAM

by the defendant, both of which are made a part of the case and
hereafter set forth.
The defendant's evidence tended to show that the hearse made
and sent was made and finished according to the contract, as he
claimed it to have been. The defendant's evidence also tended
to show that after the plaintiffs received the hearse, on the 8th day
of August 1865, they sent to the defendant two hundred dollars
towards the price of it, with the letter of that date; that they
refused to pay the balance, and that he, on the 11th day of December 1865, brought a suit against them for it, before a justice
in Franklin county, the declaration being the common counts in
assumpsit; that the plaintiffs appeared in the suit; that the justice rendered judgment against them; that they appealed from
the judgment to the county court, and that the county court for
Franklin county, at the April term 1867, rendered judgment for
the defendant against the plaintiffs for the balance of the price
of the hearse. The defects in the hearse, for which the plaintiffs
claim to recover in this action, are mentioned in the letters of
July 26th and August 8th 1865. The defendant requested the
court to hold that the letter of July 26th, from plaintiffs to defendant, was such acceptance of the hearse and waiver of defects,
and promise to pay for it, as would preclude the right of the plaintiffs to recover in this case; also, that the recovery of the judgment by defendant against the plaintiffs precluded their right to
recover in this case.
The court declined to hold in accordance with either request,
and submitted to the jury to find what the contract in fact was;
and held that if defendant *made and sent such a hearse as by
the contract he was to make and furnish, the plaintiffs were
not entitled to recover; but if he did not, they were entitled to
recover.
The defendant excepted to these rulings. Verdict for the
plaintiffs.
Rutland, July 26th 1865.
St. Albans, Vt.
Mr. L. Bingham,
Dear Sir: The 7earse is just arrived.
We are much pleased with the general proportions of the same,
except the shafts, which look clumsy. Should been worked round,
with another bend at the ends, to look carriage like.
You wrote a special letter to know if we wanted the bands on
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hubs plated. We replied we did not, but wanted ends of the nuts
plated, which you have overlooked. Some other plating we expected to find done (tho' there was no special mention made of
anything outside except the nuts),-say iron on foot-board, handle at sides and handle at doors behind. Inside, Mr. Stearns
says, it was to be like Mr. Livingston's; that is, the plated pins
to hold the coffin. This, he says, was particularly stated- when.
you gave the price. Tho' you will find nothing in our letters in
regard to this point, only it should be like Livingston's. We should
have been more particular on this point, only Mr. Stearns said it
was distinctly understood. We have no other fault to find (beg
your pardon), only the- varnish, which looks bad indeed. This,
probably, under the circumstances, is not your fault. Your money
is ready, tho' we would like to hear from you before sending same.
Respectfully,
T. S. GILSON & Co.
Rutland, Aug. 8th 1865.
L. Bingham, St. Albans, Vt.
Dear Sir: We send you this morning two
hundred dollars ($200) for the hearse. I also enclose bills of
expense we have been to, and we. have yet to get the iron laid on
the bottom to 8et the pins into; according to contract you were to
do this-furnish the pins,
$3 72
Plating pins,
9 00
"
hook,
.
..
.
1 00
"
4 nuts and capping and express, 1 50
$15 22
But we send you $200.00 trusting the above is satisfactory.
I remain, respectfully yours,
T. S. GILSON & CO.
Prout -Dunton,for the defendant.-If the hearse in qupstion
was not made according to the contract, the plaintiffs had their
election, either to accept it and pay the contract price, or to
decline to receive it: Smith's Mercantile Law 644; Miller v.
Tucker, 1 Carr. & Payne 15; Kellogg v. Denslow, 14 Conn.
411.
The defects in the hearse complained of by the plaintiffs in
this suit, were all patent, and there was such an acceptance of it
as to preclude the right of the plaintiffs to recover: 3 Parsons

GILSON v. BINGIIAM.

on Con. 47; Kellogg v. Denslow, 14 Conn. 411; Sfprague v. Blake,
20 Wend. 60; Siexas v. Mhood, 2 Caines 48; Oneida 1anufacturing Co. v. Lawrence et als., 4 Cow. 440; Hargous v. Stone.

1 Seld. 73.
Where there is no fraud, as in this case, the purchaser of personal chattels, who accepts the same, when the sale is unconditional, has no remedy, unless there is a warranty: Eellogg v.
Denslow, supra, and other cases cited.
There was no warranty in this case. A warranty applies only
to latent defects, the existence of which is not known to the
purchaser when he accepts the property. The fact that the contract was executory, does not vary the rule: Hargous v. Stone.
All the defects in the hearse, now complained of, having been
known to the plaintiffs, prior to the commencement of the suit by
the defendant against them in Franklin county, the judgment recovered by the defendant against the plaintiffs, for the balance of
the price of the hearse, is a bar to this suit: Barney v. Goff JCady, 1 D. Chip. 304; 1f1callister v. .eab, 4 Wend. 485; Still
v. Hall, 20 Wend. 51; Kfing a- .Afead v. Paddock, 18 Johns.
141 ; Cutter v. Powell, 2 S. L. C. 37 ; Jfondel v. Steele, 8 Mees.
& Wels. 858; Davis v. Taleott et als., 12 N. Y. 184; 2 C. & P.
514; Weller v. Tucker, I Id. 15.
C. H. Toyce, for the plaintiffs.-The letter of July 26th was
not an acceptance of the hearse, a waiver of defects in it, or a
promise to pay for it. Its object was to advise defendant of the
fact that the hearse had arrived and that it was not according
to the contract.
The recovery of judgment by defendant in the other suit is no
bar to this. In that suit, plaintiffs in this could plead or not as
they choose: Gale v. Cooper, 11 Vt. 597.
By statute a defendant nay plead in offset or not; but if he
does not, his claim is not barred: Gen. Sts., 33, § 1; Id. 726,
§ 23 Scott v. Niles, 40 Vt. 573; Carver v. Adams, 38 Vt. 500.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
REDFIFLD, J.-This action is assumysit for the non-delivery of

a hearse, according to special contract. The plaintiffs contracted
with defendant to manufacture and deliver at Rutland, to plaintiffs, the hearse of specific description, for the price of $210. The
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hearse was made and delivered to plaintiffs at Rutland, as defendant claims, fully according to the terms of the. contract. The
plaintiffs claim that in some things it was not fully up to what the
contract required. When the plaintiffs received the hearse they
wrote defendant, saying that they were much pleased with the
general proportions of it, suggesting that defendant had overlooked
plating the "ends of the nuts,"-" also plated pins." Varnish
looked bad, but not defendant's fault, and concludes, "Your money
is ready, though we would like to hear from you before sending."
The plaintiffs received and retained the hearse without any further
intimation to defendant until the 8th of August, when they sent
to defendant $200, with a bill of the cost of making the hearse
what the-contract called for, amounting to $15.22, saying, "But
we send you $200, trusting the above is satisfactory."
The defendant brought a suit to recover the balance of the contract price in Franklin county; the plaintiffs opposed and defended
the suit, and appealed it into the county court, but defendant
recovered the ten dollars.
I. The letter from plaintiffs to defendant, on the 26th of July,
1865, contains no intimation that plaintiffs purposed to disaffirm
and rescind the contract; on the contrary the letter, after suggestion of some deficiencies in the performance of the contract, and
commending the general style of the hearse, proceeds to inform
the defendant that the "1money is ready," indicating most evidently
that they received the hearse, accepted it on the contract, and were
ready to pay for it as contracted.
In case of warranty or fraud, on the sale of chattels, there is
no question; the property sold may be retained by the vendee,
and the sale affirmed, yet the right of the vendee to sue upon the
warranty, or for the deceit, will not be thereby affected. The
warranty is an independent contract, which is purchased by the
vendee, and when broken can be sued like nny other violated, contract. And this is alike true in case .of fraud and deceit. A
wrong has been thereby inflicted, and for that wrong the party injured has his redress. This contract was executory; a contract
to manufacture an article of a certain kind for a stated price.
There is no claim that there was warranty or fraud; and if there
were defects, they were obvious and patent. "The vendee could
either accept the article, and thereby become liable to pay the
stipulated price, or he could reject it and give notice of the non-
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acceptance, and bring his action, if lie so elects, for the non-performance of the contract; but he cannot do both, nor can he accept
it and impose conditions, and sue the other party for noncompliance
with the conditions which he has imposed. While the vendor i,
bound to perform his contract, he has the right to the return of
the article delivered, or his pay at the stipulated price.
In Percival v. Blake, 2 Car. & Payne 514, which was assumpsit for a vat which had proved defective, ABBOTT, C. J., held, if
the defects were not discovered and notice given in a reasonablo
time, it could not be any defence in an action for the price. And
in Wilson v. Tucker, 1 C. & P. 15, BuRROUGnS, J., says: "If

the goods supplied were not conformable to the order, the buyer
must return them in a reasonable time, or he will be bound to pay
for them."
In Cook v. Giles, 3 C. & P. 408, PARK, J., says (in an action
to recover the price of a threshing-machine which was defective),
that "it was the duty of defendant either to have immediately returned or given immediate notice to the plaintiff to fetch it away."
In Growzig v. Jenham, 1 Stark. Ca. 257, which was an action
for the price of clover seed sold by sample, the defendant was not
allowed to show in defence that it was not according to sample,
without proof that lie offered to return the seed. The case of
Kellogg v. Denslow, 14 Conn. 411, is a very thorough analysis
of all the cases on this subject and very decisive authority, and we
think the rule is well founded on reason and authority.
II. The case shows that on the 8th of August 1865, the plaintiff paid to the defendant $200, as a full payment of the price of
the hearse, and notified the defendant that they retained the $10
as an abatement from the contract price for some deficiencies in
the finish of the hearse. The defendant thereupon sued the plaintiffs for the $10, so abated and retained; the plaintiffs appeared,
defended and appealed the case, and were finally cast in the suit.
The issue in that case was, had these plainiiffs the right to retain
that $10, as an abatement from the contract price; and it was
decided against them, and this suit is brought to recover back the
same money which they have paid the defendant on his judgment.
This perpetual oscillation, by alternate suits of parties litigant.
upon the same subject matter, if sustained, would be a judicial
discovery of a "perpetual motion" which all philosophy has
failed to reach. But it is the interest of the state that litigation
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should cease; and when a right to property has been once put
in issue and legally tried, it is in law ended. The determination
of the former suit settled the right, as between these parties. It
is said by the plaintiffs' counsel, that the plaintiffs' actual claim
is $15.22, and he could not have recovered the balance due him
in his defence of the former suit. But the plaintiffs voluntarily
paid the stipulated price, except $10, and they could in no
event recover back a voluntary payment. Their claim was therefore limited by their-own act to $10. If these plaintiffs had sued
defendant before he sued them, they could not have recovered
the $10 because they had that in their own hands. They could
not have rec6vered beyond that, because they were precludea by
a voluntary payment.
This suit is therefore brought, because they have phid the $10
to defendant in satisfaction of a legal judgment. The judgment
is reversed, and the cause remanded.
Our attention has been called to Carver v. Adams, 38 Vt. 500,
and Gale v. Cooper, 11 Vt. 597, which decide that if a party
omits to plead an offset he is not thereby precluded from collecting his demand. But there was no offset or question of offset in
this case. It was a disputed claim and of one single item..
This case seems most unquestionable
upon its facts. There was in fact a
clear acceptance in the first instance,
and without any objection or remonstrance on the part of the plaintiff,
of the very article stipulated on the
part of the defendant, and for the nondelivery of which, according to the
contract, this action is brought. In addition to this the defects complained of
were patent, and required no inspection
or skill to detect them. Under these
circumstances it would be impossible to
find any precedent for maintaining the
action: Wilkins v. Stevens, 8 Vt. 214,
and cases cited. In addition to this
the defendant had before brought an
action for the price of the thing sold,
and recovered the very sum now sought
to be recovered back, and upon the very
ground upon which this suit is now
attempted to be defended. So that in

fact the conceded facts in the case show,
that the plaintiff never had any cause
of action, and this has already been adjudged by a competent tribunal, in an
action between the same parties.
If it were not for these very obvious
defects in the plaintiff.s case, we might
suppose it practicable to raise other very
nice questions, often growing out of
similar states of fact.
1. There is undoubtedly, where an
article is bought for a particular purpose,
an implied warranty, " that it shall be
reasonabry fit for the particular purpose
for which it is wanted:" BE NNETT, J.,
in Brown v. Sayles, 27 Vt. 227-229;
citing Gray v. Cox, 4 B. & C. 108;
Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 533, Brown
v. Edgington, 2 Man. & Gr. 279, Shepherd v. Pybus, 3 Id. 867. But from the
same cases it sufficiently appears, that
this implied warranty only extends to
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the point, that the article shall be reasonably fit for w,;e as such, and not that it

.lall be of any special degree of perfection, as seems to have been claimed in
the present case.
2. If there exists a warranty of the
quality of an article sold, to the extent
ol such warranty, whether it be express
or implied, the vendee may accept the
article and show any defect in the warranty in defence of the action for the
price, as far as such defence extends, or
he may pay the price, and then maintain
his special action for the damages suffered by the breach of the warranty:
Brown v. Sayles, aite, and cases cited.
And in cases of sale upon warranty,
without fraud, it has been held the
vendor cannot rescind the contract
of sale, bat is compelled to resort, for
his redress to an action for the broach
of warranty: Thornton v. Wynn, 12
Wheaton 183; IVest v. Cuttling, 19
%rt.536.

But the difficulties in applying these
principles to the facts of the principal
case seem too formidable to be dwelt
upon. No doubt, under a special contract to furnish a particular article of a
definite description, there will be an option to accept or not. In such cases

the acceptance without objection will
always bear the aspect of a final election
and as such be held binding upon the
party.
3. The point of the defence resting
upon the estoppel of a former adjudication is practically very important, and
admits of no question. The cases, both
English and American, are very explicit, that money paid as a mere voluntary payment, without any such stress or
pressure, as a man of proper firmness
and self-respect could not fairly be expected to withstand, cannot be recovered
back. And the same rule holds, with
even more uniformity, in case of money
paid in obedience to legal process, still
in force. For, where money is paid
upon a void or erroneous judgment, in
obedience to process, which the party
could not legally resist, but which
have since (both the judgment and the
process) been set aside, the money may
be recovered back, but not otherwise.
This has been clearly recognised since
the date of Mlarr-ot v. Hampton, 7 T.
R. 209, s. c. 2 Smith's Lead. Cases
237, where the cases will be found collected and arranged.
I. F. R.
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The legislature of a state may compel a municipal corporation to construct highways, or other improvements for public purposes, withoutthe consent of the corporate
authorities, or a vote of the citizens.
So it may direct the corporation to levy a tax or to issue its bonds to pay for
such improvement.
The provision of the Constitution of the State of New York- Art. 7, § 12, prohibiting the contracting of, any debt by or in behalf of the state unless such debt
be authorized by a law submitted to the people, does not apply to the debts of
cities or other subordinate municipal corporations, bet to those of the state itself.

ANt Act of the Legislature of New York appointed a special
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commission to lay out and work certain highways in the town of
Yonkers, and provided that the money required for that purpose
should be raised by the sale of town bonds payable at remote
future dates, with interest payable annually. The act further
provided that the supervisor and town clerk should sigri and
deliver the bonds to the commissioners upon their requisition;
but it made no provision for any form of assent to the issue of the
bonds on the part of the town, its tax-payers, or any of its officers.
In this cane the supervisor having refused to issue the bonds
on the requisition of the commissioner, the Supreme Court issued
a peremptory mandamus to him to execute and deliver them.
From this an appeal was taken to this court.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CHuRcH, C. J.-The legislation involved in this case is challenged upon the ground that it is not competent for the legislature
to compel the town of Yonkers to incur a debt for the improvements authorized to be made. It is conceded that the legislature
could direct the improvements to be made, and could lawfully
inipose a ,tax upon the property of the citizens of the town to
pay the necessary expenses, or that it might authorize a town
debt to be created with the consent of the.people of the town, or
some officer or officers representing the municipality, but it is
contended that it cannot directly compel the creation of the debt
without the consent of the citizens or town authorities.
All legislative power is conferred upon the Senate and Assembly, and if an act is within the legitimate exercise of that power
it is valid, unless some restriction or limitation can be found in
the Constitution itself. The distinction between the United States
Constitution and our state Constitution is, that the former confers upon Congress certain specific powers only, while the latter confers upon the legislature all legislative power. In the one case
the powers specifically granted can only be exercised, in the
other all the legislative powers not prohibited may be exercised.
It cannot be denied that the subject of the laws in question is
within legislative powers. The making and improvement of public highways and the imposition and collection of taxes are among
the ordinary subjects of legislation. The towns of the state
possess such powers as the legislature confers upon them. They
are a part of the machinery of the state government, and perform
VOL. XX.-6
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important municipal functions which are regulatel and controlled
by the legislature. Private property cannot be taken for public
use without compensation, but this principle does not interfere with
the right of taxation for proper purposes. The legislature in
substance directed certain highways to be constructed in the town
of Yonkers, and imposed a tax upon the town to pay the expenses
of the work, but to prevent too large a tax at one time, they
directed bonds to be given payable at different periods, so that no
more than a limited sum should become due at one time.
The bonds to be given are town bonds, they are to be issued
by town officers, and the tax to pay them is imposed upon the
property of the town. If the legislature may authorize the town
to incur this debt, why may it not direct it to be done ? As a
question of power, I am unable to find any restriction in the Constitution. It is not within the judicial province to correct all
legislative abuses. That local expenditures and improvements
should in general be left to the discretion of those immediately
interested is manifestly just, and is in accordance with the theory
of our government, but when power is conceded, we have no right
to inquire into the motives or reasons for doing the particular act.
The legislation in question is open to serious criticism. It
compels a large, if not extravagant, expenditure of money, and
imposes onerous burdens upon the people without their consent.
If the object of the expenditure was private, or if the money to
be raised was directed to be paid to a private corporation, who
were authorized to use the improvements for private gain, the
question in my judgment would be quite different, and in this
respect there is a limit beyond which legislative power cannot be
legitimately exercised. But the defendants cannot avail themselves of this principle. Here the purpose is confessedly public,
and the taxing power for such purposes is restrained only by
restrictive provisions, and whether a tax shall be imposed for the
whole expenditure in one year or spread over a series of years,
and in the meantime the obligations of the town given, are matters
of detail and discretion which do not affect the power, and with
which courts cannot interfere. It is claimed, however, that the
laws in question violate that provision of the Constitution which
prohibits the creation of debts except to a limited extent, unless
the laws authorizing them are submitted to the people: Constitution, art. 7, § 12. The provision is: "Except the debts
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specified in the 10th and 11th sections of this article, no debt
shall be hereafter contracted by or in behalf of the state, unless
such debt shall be authorized by a law," &c., to be submitted to
the people. The debts referred to in the tenth and eleventh sections, which are excepted, are:-First. Debts which in the
aggregate shall not exceed one million of dollars to meet "casual
deficits, failures in revenues, or for expenses not provided for."
Second. Debts to repel invasion. Collating the 10th, 11th, and
12th sections, it is evident that the prohibited debts are state
debts, that is, debts against the state as such, and not town,
county, or city debts. The latter, unfortunately, are irot prohibited. If the prohibition applied to municipal debts, it would
not be competent for the legislature to authorize the creation of
any such debts, except by a submission to the people.. It is manifest that they can confer such authority, and there is nothing in
the Constitution that forbids the legislature from exercising the
power directly itself for the proper local public purposes. It is
quite clear the creation of the debt in question is not within the
meaning of, and is not therefore prohibited by, the restrictive
clause in the Constitution against the creation of state debts.
It is also claimed that these acts violate the 18th section of the
7th article of the Constitution, which* provides that "every law
which imposes, continues, or revives a tax, shall distinctly state the
tax and the object to which it is to be applied." Itis urged that
while the cost of the roads are limited to $20,000 a mile, exclusive of bridges, the commissioners are authorized to build the
bridges, and there being no limitation of the expense of building
them, that the tax is not distinctly stated and the laws are therefore void. Conceding that the construction given to this clause
of the Constitution by the defendants is the correct one, and that
it applies to a local as well as a state tax, we think the point is
untenable. Sect. 17 of the Act of 1870 confers upon the commissioners power to make the road and "to grade, drain, gravel,
and improve the same, and construct all necessary bridges
therefor." The 21st section limits the aggregate expenses of
"making, grading, draining, and improving said road" to twenty
thousand dollars *per mile, "exclusive of bridges." The 19th
section provides that "such sums of money as may be necessary
to make, grade, drain, and otherwise improve "said road, shall be
raised by the issue of town bonds," &c.
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We think that this act recognised a distinction between the
road and the bridges. It is true, the former is limited to $20,000,
while the latter is unlimited, but there is no provision in that
act, or in the Act of 1869, for raising the money to pay
for bridges. The clause requiring the issue of bonds must be
held to apply to the "road," exclusive of bridges, as specified in
the sections referred to. The "said road" is the road specified
before, and that road excludes bridges. Neither under the Act
of 1869 or 1870, could the commissioners lawfully demand the
issue of bonds to pay for constructing bridges. The Act of 1871
supplied this defect by expressly authorizing the issue of bonds
for the bridges as well as the road, and limiting the expenditure
therefor.
It is further objected that the commissioners were not entitled
to the issue of any bond until all the roads specified in the Act
of 1870 bad been duly laid out, and the report of the commissioners of estimate and assessment as to all the roads had been
confirmed. By the original Act of 1869, four roads were to be
laid out and improved, and section 8 of that act provided that
"no part of the money to be expended shall be paid out, nor any
contract therefor made, until all the roads for their entire length
have been laid out and established, as herein provided, and the
right of way shall be acquired for the section of the road on
which the money is to be expended." Sqct. 12 provides that
"Cafter the report of the commissioners of estimate and assessment shall be confirmed, the said report shall be delivered to
the commissioners for laying out and making said road, who shall
thereupon be authorized to cause such improvements to be made."
The Act of 1870 repealed the clause above quoted in section
3,but left section 12 unaltered. The report of the commissioners
of estimate and assessment as to the four roads specified in the
Act of 1869, was confirmed before the amendatory Act of 1870
was passed, and no report has been made as to the four additional
roads specified in the Act of 1870. By the repeal of dhe express restriction contained in section 8, we may infer an intention
to have the four roads, as to which the report of the commissioners of estimate and assessment had been confirmed, constructed,
without requiring the confirmation of the report as to the additional roads; section 12 is not necessarily inconsistent with this
intention. At most, it contains only an implied restrietion, and
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it is entirely cQnsistent with the repeal of section 3, by construing the implied prohibition against proceeding with the work, to
apply only to such portions of the improvements as to which no
report had been made or confirmed, or, in other words, that the
commissioners were authorized to proceed with those improvements as to which a report had been confirmed.
Looking at all the provisions of both acts, and the action of
the legisbature, this seems to be the most rational construction.
Besides, the right to have the bonds issued is not dependent upon
the confrmation of the report, and it is at least questionable
whether the town officers could avail themselves of this point, if
the construction claimed should prevail, but is unnecessary to
determine this question..
We feel constrained to affirm the judgment.
In this case it would seem that the
highest court of the state of New York
have gone farther in asserting the control of the legislnture over municipal
corporations than any other court in
any of the states has heretofore gone.
Indeed, the decision is in direct conflict
with one recently made by the highest
court of Illinois in The People v. The
Maqor of Chicago, 51 Ills. 36.
Some of the earlier leading cases
which seem to show that the legislature
cannot force a municipal corporation
into debt are Atkins v. The Town of
Randolph, 31 Vt. 236 ; The Mayor
of Philadelphiav. Sharpless, 21 Penna.
147, where Judge BLACK says, "they
cannot bind a corporation by legislation ;" Hampshure v. Franklin, 16 Mass.
83 ; Bordenheimerv. Richmond, 2 Greenl.
42 ; Brunswick v. Litchfield, 2 Id. 28.
None of the cases cited in Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations, at page 230,
in support of the doctrine that municipal corporations are the creatures of
the legislature and subject to its control, go further than the cases of The
County of Richland v. The County of
Lawrenq, 12 Ills. I ; Trustees of School
v. Tutman, 13 Id. 27 ; Montpdier v. E.
.lontpelier, 29 Vt. 12; Reynolds v.

Baldwin, I La. Ann. 162; Brown v.
Corporation of Shreveport, 5 Id. 661.
Indeed, it will be seen on examination
that these are the strongest cases to be
found in American reports, or elsewhere, in support of the principle, aid
they certainly do not go so far as to
abrogate allthe essential functions of h
corporation, as this decision seems to do.
If this decision is right, the legislature could easily have raised the nine
millions for the enlargement of the
Erie Canal in 1851, by directing the
municipal authorities of counties, cities,
and towns to issue bonds, the payment
of which, principal nnd interest, could
have been provided for by annual taxation, as in the case of these town bonds.
It is true that in the case of The
People ex rel. The Albany and Susquehanna Railroad Co., Judge PORTFRn, in
delivering the opinion of the court,
said: e1 It is now settled that the legislature may confer on municipal corporations power to take stock in railroad
companies, and that the authority can
be conferred in such a manner that the
objects can be attained either with or
without a popular vote." This lan.
guage is a substantial quotation from
Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Walker 327.
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But it is submitted that there was nothing
in either of these cases which warrants
the use of such language, inasmuch as
the question had been submitted to the
popular vote in both cases.
The language of Chief Judge CHURCH,
in reference to legislative omnipotence,
does not fully accord with that of Judge
BROWN, in Rodman v. Munson, 13 Barb.
63. This opinion was fully sanctioned
by the decision of the same case in the
Court of Appeals.
But the strongest ground in support
of the position, that the legislature of
the state of New York had no power to
pass these mandatory acts, is found in
sect. 12 of art. 7 of the Constitution,
which provides that, excepting a certain
class of debts to which it is conceded
this does not belong, "No debt shall
be hereafter contracted by oi in behalf
of the state unless such debt shall be
authorized by a law to be submitted to
a vote of the people."
Now it is submitted that if the issue
of those bonds create any debt whatever,
it is a state debt, according to the doctrine of Judge Cisuncus's opinion. The
creation of the debt is the act of the
legislature, and not of the corporation.
The doctrine, facit per alium facit per
se, applies. It is in all respects the act
of the state, and in no respect the act
of the corporation. Not so in the case
of mere enabling acts of the state. In
the latter case, a vital power is recog-

nised in the corporation, which is set in
motion by the legislature; and it is
confidently asserted that this kind of
mandatory legislation upon corporations
is without precedent in this country or
in England.
That the issue of these town bonds
providing for the payment of certain
sums at future dates with interest does
create a debt, is settled in the cases of
Tle People v. Newell, 7 N. Y. 1, and
Rodman v. Munson, 13 Barb. 188. Those
cases arose under the Canal Certificate
Act of July 10th 1851, where an attempt
was made, to borrow money to enlarge
the Erie Canal without creating a debt
binding on the state. The fact that in
the case of the town bonds the money
to pay them, principal and interest, is
to be collected from certain localities,
and not from the whole state, makes no
difference in the character of the debt,
according to the case of Thomas v.
Leland, 24 Wend. 65, where it was held
that the legislature had full power to
localize taxation.
It is still insisted by parties opposed
to this power of mandatory legislation,
that inasmuch as Judge CHUnCH has
not alluded in his opinion to any of the
authorities above referred to, and as
the question came before the court upon a
non-enumerated motion, a different conclusion might be arrived at by the court
on further argument.
T. B.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
JOHN M. STUART, ASSIGNEE, &c., v. HINES

ET AL.

No valid lien upon property of a bankrupt can be acquired by proceedings in a
state court after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
Nor is an assignee in bankruptcy bound to go into a state court to defend a suit
commenced against the bankrupt after the filing of the petition. Such an action
is as to him a nullity.
In a proceeding against a debtor as an involuntary bankrupt, the order under
section 40 of the Bankrupt Act, re luiring the debtor to show cause why the prayer
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of the petition. that he be declared bankrupt should not be granted, may be served
personally outside the territory of the jurisdiction of the court making it.
I That order need not be served by a marshal or officer of the court, but may be
served by any one authorized by the solicitor for the petitioner.
The rule is the same where one or more of several partners institute proceedings
in bankruptcy voluntarily, in which certain members of the partnership refuse to
join ; the parties so refusing are proceeded against as involuntary bankrupts, and
service of the order to show cause why they should not be declared bankrupt may be
made on them, outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and by a person
other than the executive officer of the court.
Accordingly, where such an order, made in the District Court of the United
States for the Southern District of New York, in a case where the application was
by certain members of a partnership against certain other members refusing to
join in the application, was served personally on tile
debtor in New Jersey, by a
person other than the executive officer of the court, but authorized by the solicitors
for petitioner, held, such service was correct as to place and mode.

ON the 28th day of September 1870, the plaintiff filed in the
Muscatine District Court his petition, claiming that, as assignee
of the estate and effects of Thomas M. Isett, a bankrupt, he was
the absolute owner, for the uses and purposes set forth in "An
Act to' establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the
United States," of certain real estate in the petition particularly
described, and that the defendants George R. Hines and David
W. Eames, and Jacob Butler as their trustee, made some claims
to said premises a dverse to the estate and title of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff prayed that his title and estate in and to said premises
'be established and quieted; and that the defendants be barred,
and estopped from claiming or asserting any right or title therein.
The defendants, Hines and Eames, and Jacob Butler, filed their
answer, denying that plaintiff was the owner of the premises described, and averring that Jacob Butler, as trustee, was the owner
thereof in fee. For further answer, they alleged that all the proceedings in bankruptcy against Isett were without jurisdiction and
void, and that the assignment to plaintiff was void. Subsequently
the defendants filed a further answer, alleging, "That the said
defendant, Jacob Butler, as trustee for defendants Hines and
Eames, purchased said premis es at sheriff's sale, made under an
execution issued from the office of the clerk of this court upon
a judgment regularly obtained at the June Term of this court, in
the year 1869, as will more fully appear from an inspection of the
records and papers of the case, entitled 'Hines & Eames v. Isett,
Kerr & Co.,' in which a writ of attachment was issued against the
defendants Thomas M. I.sett, John Kerr, and Watson B. Farr,
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and the said premises were, on the 13th day of February 1869,
attached as the property of defendants. That this court, before any
other legal proceedings were had, obtained full and exclusive jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter of the action. That
neither the said defendants nor the said John M. Stuart appeared
-or made defence in said action; and defendants aver that said
defendants Isett, Kerr & Co., and the said plaintiff in this action
are estopped from asserting any claim or title to said premises, so
long as said judgment remains unreversed, and is not cancelled
or set aside."
The cause was tried by the court, and judgment was rendered
for the plaintiff.
The defendants appealed.
Cloud

Broomhall, for appellants.

Charles A. Peabody (of New York) and Bichman & Carskadden, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DAY, C. J.-On and prior to August 13th 1868, Thomas M.
Isett, John Kerr, and Watson B. Farr were copartners, under
the name of Isett, Kerr & Co., doing business as bankers and
brokers, at the city of New York, in the Southern Federal District of New York. On the 31st day of IDecember 1868, Kerr
and Farr filed their petition in bankruptcy in the United States
District Court of that district, asking that they and their copartner, Isett, be declared bankrupts; alleging that Isett refused
to join the petition with them. On the 27th of March 1869,
Isett, Kerr, and Farr were adjudged bankrupts. On the 25th
of October 1869, the plaintiff, John M. Stuart, was regularly
chosen to be assignee of the estate and effects of the said bankrupts. On the 28th day of October 1869, the proper register
in bankruptcy executed a deed of assignuient, conveying to said
John M. Stuart all the estate, real and personal, of which the
said Thomas M. Isett was seised, br in which he was interested, on
the 31st day of December 1868. This deed was filed for record
in Muscatine county, Iowa, on the 9th day of November 1869.
Thomas M. Isett owned the real estate in controversy, situated in
Muscatine county, Iowa. Hines and Eames caused an attachment to be levied on said property on the 13th day of February
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1869. They obtained judgment on the 14th day of June 1869.
The property was purchased by Jacob Butler, as trustee offHines
and Eames, on the 25th June 1870.
Appellants discuss the points made in their assignment of errors
under two general heads.
1st. Did the judgment of the state court estop the plaintiff
'from proceeding in this suit ?
2d. Had the bankruptcy court jurisdiction over either the
person or property of Thomas M. Isett?
We will pursue the same order in our consideration of the case.

I. As to the effect of the judgments against Isett, Kerr d. Co.,
in the Muscatine District and Circuit Courts.
Appellants claim that by these proceedings valid and subsisting
liens have been created in favor of the defendants. In support
of their position they cite numerous authorities, all of which we
have examined with a care commensurate with the importance of
the questions involved in this appeal.
None of them, in our opinion, support the position they are
cited to sustain.
[The learned judge here carefully reviews the following authorities cited by appellants: In re Htouseberger, 2 Bank. Reg. 37;
In re Hugh Campbell, 7 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 100; Ex parte
William Burns, Id. 105; In re I. W. Kerr, 2 Bank. Reg. 124;
In re Francis Schnepf, 7 Am. Law Reg. 204; In re Clarke and
Binninger, 3 Bank. Reg. 123; Clarke v. Binninger, 9 Am. Law
Reg. 304; The United States v. The Judges of the Superior
Court, Id. 297; Sampson v. Benton, 4 Bank. Reg. 1; In re
George S. Davis, 2 Id. 125; Bowman v. Harding,4 Id. 5; Bates
v. Tappan, 3 Id. 159; Armstrong, Assignee, v. Bickey Bros., 2
Id. 150; Sedgwick v. Minick, I Id. 204; -Hawkins's Appeal, 8
Am. Law Reg. 205; -lxparte Donaldson, 7 Id. 213; In re Wallace, 2 Bank. Reg. 52, and concludes as follows :-]
Thus we have reviewed all the authorities cited by appellants.
Not one of them is a case where an attempt was made in a state
court to acquire a lien against the property of the bankrupt after
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. Not one of them even
by implication or analogy sustains the validity of such a lien.
Indeed the last case (In re Wallace, 2 Bank. Beg. 52) is a very
strong one against the position of appellants; for if an attachment levied within four months prior to the filing of the petition
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in bankruptcy, will in another court be held void, and execution
for the enforcement of the judgment be stayed by injunction,
what becomes of an attachment levied many ,nonths after the
petition in bankruptcy is filed ?
In the case at bar the petition for an adjudication in bankruptcy
was filed on the 31st day of December 1868. The filing of this
petition constituted the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding. "The filing of a petition for adjudication in bankruptcy,
either by a debtor in his own behalf, or by any creditor against a
debtor, upon which an order may be issued by the court, or by a
register, in the manner provided in section four, shall be deemed
and taken to be the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy
under this act :" Bankruptcy Act, § 38.
"Where an adjudication of bankruptcy is made following the
filing of a petition, then it is judicially established that the proceedings in the case commenced when the petition was filed :"
In re Patterson, Bank. Reg. Sup. 27.
Section 14 of the Bankrupt Act provides: "That as soon as
said assignee is appointed and qualified, the judge, or where there
is no opposing interest, the register shall by an instru-aent under
his hand, assign and convey to the assignee all the estate real
and personal of the bankrupt with all his deeds, books and papers
relating thereto, and such assignment shall relate back to the
commencement of said proceedings in bankruptcy, and thereupon,
by operation of law, the title to all such property and estate,
both real and personal, shall vest in said assignee, although the
same is then attached on mesne process as the property of the
debtor, and shall dissolve any such attachment made within four
months next preceding the commencement of said proceedings.
The date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy becomes the
date from which the assignee takes all the property of the bankrupt which was his property at that date:" In re Patterson,
Su)ra.
"The commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy operates as
a sulpersedeas of all process in the hands of the officer of any
other court, and as an injunction against all other proceedings
than such as may afterwards be had under the authority of the
court of bankruptcy, until such case is closed. Thus the levy of
an execution, or the filing of a bill to foreclose a mortgage, or
the filing of a libel in ren, or the issuing of a distress-warrant,
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or the filing of a mechanics' lien claim where the lien only exists
from the time of such filing, or the issuing of a writ of replevin,
for the purpose of affecting the estate, are null and void, when
such proceedings are instituted after that time. Claims against
the bankrupt's property can only be enforced in the court of
bankruptcy during the pendency of the proceedings, and this
principle extends not only to liens, but to all controversies concerning even the title to property which was in his possession at
the time of filing the petition :" Bump's Law and Practice of
Bankruptcy, citing Pennington v. Sale and _Phelan, 1 Bank. Reg.
157; In re Kerosene Oil Co., 2 Id. 164; s. c. 3 Id. 31; In re
People'sMail Steamship Co., 2 Id. 170; In re Charles .H.Wynne,
4 Id. 5; In re -Day, 3 Id. 81; In re Vogel, 2 Id. 188; s. c. 8
Id. 49, which fully sustain the doctrine of the text.
The conveyance to the assignee was made on the 28th day of
October 1869, and related back to the '31st day of December
1868, and vested in the assignee all the property of the bankrupt
owned by him at that date. The attachments under which the
defendants claim were all -levied after the petition in bankruptcy
was filed. The authorities cited clearly settle the docirine that
after the filing of a petition in bankruptcy no valid lien upon the
property at that time owned by the bankrupt can be acquired by
proceedings in a state court, and are conclusive in favor of the
assignee against these defendants. And if this were not so, the
requirements of the Bankrupt Act might easily be ignored, and
its provisions nullified. It can have force and efficiency, and can
accomplish its purposes, by no other construction.
There is another view of this case which is equally conclusive
against the title of these defendants.
The sale of the land upon execution to Jacob Butler under the
Hines and Eames judgment occurred on the 25th of June 1870.
On the 9th of November 1869, the deed of conveyance to the
assignee was recorded in Muscatine county, and by the provisions
of the Bankrupt Act, section 14, related back to the 81st day
of December 1868, the date of filing the petition in bankruptcy.
It was apparent of record then, at the time of the sale upon
execution, that the judgment-debtor had no title to or interest in
the property sold. Hence, under the doctrine of N'orton et al. v.
Williams, 9 Iowa 528, the purchaser at sheriff's sale acquired no
title. $ee also Bell v. Bvans et al., 10 Iowa 853.
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Appellants claim that the allegation that they are the owners
of the premises in dispute by virtue of the proceedings in the
state courts, makes a counter-claim of title, which, not being
denied by plaintiff, must be taken as admitted. This position is
not tenable. The allegation of title is made merely as a defence
to plaintiff's claim. No affirmative relief is sought against the
plaintiff. A counter-claim is a cause of action in favor of the
defendants or some of them, against the plaintiffs or some of
them: Revision, § 2889.
It is further claimed that it was the duty of the assignee to
appear and defend in the state courts in place of the bankrupt,
and that, having failed to do so, he is estopped from asserting
any claim to the property. This position is equally unsound.
The Bankrupt Act authorizes the assignee to prosecute and
defend for the bankrupt causes pending at the time of filing the
petition in bankruptcy: Sect. 16.
We find no provision of the Bankrupt Law, nor any adjudged
case, which requires the assignee to go into a state court to defend
an action commenced against the bankrupt subsequently to the .late
of filing the petition in bankruptcy. Such a determination would
be in direct conflict with the whole current of the authorities,
which hold that all proceedings instituted against the bankrupt
after the filing of the petition, in any other court than the court
of bankruptcy, are invalid. Besides, the judgments in all the
cases which have been prosecuted to judgment were rendered
before the assignee was appointed.
We conclude that the first position assumed by appellants cannot be maintained.
II. As to the. jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over the person and property of Thomas H. Isett.-This question may be
briefly considered. Appellee claims that the deed of assignment
is, in this case, conclusive that such jurisdiction existed. In the
view which we take of the case, we need not determine as to the
soundness of this claim.
The petition in bankruptcy was addressed to the Hon. SAMUEL
BLATCHFORD, judge of the District Court of the United States for
the Southern District of New York. The order upon Thomas M?.
Isett to show cause why the prayer of the petition should not be
granted was served in Jersey City, state of New Jersey, by Fisher
A. Baker, one of the solicitors of Farr and Kerr, the petitioners.
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Appellants claim: 1st. That personal service cannot be made
out of the district in which the petition is filed. 2d. That service must be made by the United States marshal, or by a messenger, as provided by statute.
1. The first position is not sound. Section 36 of the Bankrupt Act provides that a partnership may be declared bankrupt
upon the petition of any one of its members. Rule 18, promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States, Bump's Bankruptcy 487, provides that notice shll be given to any partner
refusing to join in the petition, in the same manner as provided
in the case of a debtor petitioned against. Section 40 of the
Bankrupt Act provides that upon the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy the court shall direct the entry of an order requiring
the debtor to appear and show cause why the prayer of the petition should not be granted. " A copy of the petition and of such
order to show cause shall be served on such debtor by delivering
the same to him personally or leaving the same at his last or usual
place of abode; or if such debtor cannot be found, or his place
of residence ascertained, service shall be made by publication in
such manner as the judges may direct :" Bump's Bankruptcy 449.
The act is entirely silent as to the place of service, the mode onlyds
designated. Under section 11 of the Bankrupt Act, any member
of a firm may file his petition to have the firm declared bankrupt
in any district where the partnership business has been carried on
for the longest period of the six months immediately preceding
the filing of the petition. In such case, if the other members
of the firm reside out of the district where the business is carried
on and the petition is filed, efficiency can be given to this provision only by service out of the district. We do not, however,
understand appellants to deny the power to obtain service out of
the district. They contend that such service can be made only
by publication. But the act authorizes service by publication
only when the party to be served cannot be found, or his place of
residence ascertained. The fact that Isett was found and personally served, shows that he does not come within the exception
authorizing service by publication. Hence if any service outside
of the district in which the petition is filed is. proper, personal
service must be.
2. The second position is, in our opinion, equally untenable.
The act nowhere provides by whom this service shall be made.
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Section 11 of the act provides that the judge or register shall
issue a warrant directed to the marshal; and section 40 provides
that the court may issue a warrantto the marshal of the district
commanding him to arrest the said bankrupt. The fact that the
act makes special provision for the service of certain processes
by the marshal and remains entirely silent as to the person by
whom the order to show cause shall be served, is a strong argument against the position that such order can be served by the
marshal only. IExpressio unius est exzlusio alterius.
In the case of lielc1illan v. Scott and Allen, 2 Bank. Reg. 28,
the question was raised whether a subpc-na could be served by
the party. In determining the question, MCCANDLESS, District
Judge, holds this language: "It is true that the marshal is the
executive officer of the court, and may be directed by the court
to serve it, but the mandate of the writ is not to him but to the
witness who is commanded to appear and testify. As there is no
legislation of Congress directing the service of a subpoena by the
marshal, we do not feel disposed to depart from the practice of
the state courts which has always permitted the party to serve the
precept and allowed him costs for the same. The 1st section of
the Act of 24th of September 1799, requires the marshal "to
execute throughout the district all lawful precepts directed to him,
and issued under the authority of the United States. 'But the
subpcena is not directed to him, but to the witness, and the marshal might legitimately refuse to serve it unless commanded so to
do by an order of the court." The order to show cause in like
manner is not directed to the marshal but to the debtor, and in
the absence of legislation upon the subject, we know of no reason
why another may not serve it.
III. Some objection is urged in the argument to the sufficiency
of the averments of the petition in bankruptcy. It is averred
that the petitioners for the six months next preceding the application have been residents of the judicial district in which the
petition is filed, and that they and said Isett within said time
were partners in trade in said district. Whilst it may have been
more formal if the petition had averred that during the past six
months they had been engaged for tie longest period in business
in said district, thus negativing the idea that as to the said firm
the proper jurisdiction was elsewhere, yet as the court to which
it was directed has treated it as sufficient, and it does not appear
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that the firm did business for a longer period in any other district,
we must, for the purposes of this proceeding, regard the petition
as containing enough to confer upon the court jurisdiction of the
application.
We discover no error in the judgment of the District Court,
and it is affirmed.
4

Supreme Court of Kansas.
WILLIAM CLOUGH

ET AL. V.

CHARLES A. HART

ET AL.

Where a written contract between a county and an individual shows upon its
face that it was made by the county for the professional services of the individual as
an attorney and counsellor at law, which services are such as the law requires to
be performed by the county attorney, such contract is primd facie void.
Where a written contract between a city of the first class and an individual
shows upon its face that it was made by the city for the professional services of the
individual, as an attorney and counsellor at law, which services are such as the
law requires to be performed by the city attorney, such contract is primdfacievoid.
Where the petition of the plaintiff sets forth such a contract as a foundation for
a decree for the specific performance of such contract, but does not set forth any
facts which would show that such contract is not void, such petition does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

THIS was an action to compel the specific performance of t*o
certain contracts, and also for other relief not n'ecessary to mention. One of said contracts was made between the plaintiffs and
the city of Leavenworth, and the other contract was made between
the plaintiffs and the county of Leavenworth. The other facts
are stated in the opinion of the court, which was delivered Jy
VALENTINE, J.-The plaintiffs made the City of Leavenworth,
the County of Leavenworth, the -Missouri River Railroad Company, the Leavenworth, Atchison, and North-Western Railroad
Company, and the thirty-six individual persons named in the title
of the case, parties defendants; and, while the plaintiffs asked
relief against all the defendants, yet their whole case depended
upon the specific performance of the contracts.
The first and principal question, then, for us to consider is,
whether their contract was valid or not. The defendants raised
the question of their validity in the court below by demurring to
the plaintiff's petition. The court. below sustained the demurrer,
and the plaintiffs now bring the question to this court.for review.
The plaintiffs alleged in their petition below that, "on the 16th
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day of November 1868, the county of Leavenworth aforesaid of
the one part, at and with the consent of the county attorney
of said county, made and entered into a certain written contract,
of that date, with these plaintiffs, parties as aforesaid of the other
part, of which written contract the following is a copy, to wit:"This article of agreement, made and entered into this 16th
day of November, A. D. 1868, by and between Clough & Wheat,
of the one part, and the County of Leavenworth, of the other
part, Witnesseth, that, whereas the County of Leavenworth has
two hundred and fifty thousand dollars of the capital stock of the
Missouri River Railroad Company, and, as such stockholder,
claims certain rights against said railroad company, and those
persons who claim to have purchased that tract of land known as
the 'Diminished Delaware Reserve,' under a treaty with the
Delaware Indians, and the said county is desirous of employing
said Clough & Wheat as attorneys to render such assistance in
enforcing such claims as they properly and reasonably can.
"Now for that purpose the county of Leavenworth, in the state
of Kansas, hereby undertakes and promises to and with said
Clough & Wheat to pay them the sum of twenty-five hundred
dollars, twelve hundred and fifty dollars thereof now, six hundred
and twenty-five dollars thereof one year from this date, and six
hundred and twenty-five dollars thereof two years from this time;
if the litigation ends at any time within such two years, then
immediately all of said two thousand five hundred dollars then
unpaid shall be due and paid immediately. And for the same
consideration said county hereby further undertakes and promises
to and with said Clough & Wheat, to pay them for such services
the value of three per cent. of all the said county has or may
obtain as such a stockholder as aforesaidand to assign and trans-'
fer three per cent. in amount of all the stock it has in said company to said Clough & Wheat when thereto requested. And the
said Clough & Wheat, on their part, undertake and promise to
and with said county, to perform such services as those above
mentioned for the consideration aforesaid.
"It is understood and agreed by and between the parties
hereto, that the County of Leavenworth will pay one-half of all
the travelling expenses, including fare, and all hotel and printing
bills by said Clough & Wheat, necessarily or properly incurred
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or paid in, about, or in consequence of attending to any of the
matters -aforesaid, or any suits or proceedings in relation thereto."
"In testimony whereof, the parties aforesaid have hereunto
subscribed their names, the said Clough & Wheat in their own
proper person, and the county of Leavenworth, by its agent,
attested by the clerk of said county, and the seal thereof, signed
"CLOUGH & WHEAT.
in duplicate.
"The County of Leavenworth, by

B. B. MOORE,

"Chairman Board Co. Comm'rs.
"Attested by the undersigned, County Clerk of Leavenworth
county, under my hand and the seal of said county.
"OLIVER DIEFENDOBF, County Clerk.
[" Seal of Leavenworth County,
"5 cents Int. Rev. Stamp cancelled.]
"And that the said county then had and' owned two hundred
and fifty thousand dollars paid-up stock in and to the capital stock
of t]Ae Missouri River Railroad Company.
"And said plaintiffs further -aver that they have duly performed
ll the conditions of said contract on their part. And that on
December 7th 1868, these plaintiffs requested the county of
Leavenworth aforesaid to assign and transfer three per cent. of
the stock by it owned and mentioned in said contract to these
plaintiffs, but said county then neglected and refused so to do.
" And plaintiffs further aver, that the several defendants
herein knew and had notice of the making of the contracts aforesaid, at the time when the same were respectively.made, and from
thence hitherto."
The allegations of the petition with respect to the contract
made with the city of Leavenworth are the same as those with
the county, and hence it is not necessary for ns to repeat them.
The two contracts are in form identical. - That, however, made
with the city is dated October 20th 1868.
These contracts, in our opinion, are void, or rather they appear
upon their face to be void, and there is no allegation in the petition that shows them to be otherwise than void.
The county and city of Leavenworth attempt, by their contracts, to employ the plaintiffs to perform precisely what it is the
duty under the law of the county and city attorneys respectively
to perform. They completely ignore the law. We have examVo.
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ined all the authorities referred to by counsel for both plaintiffs
and defendants, to wit: 2 Sandf. S. C. 460 ; 10 Bosw. 544, 545;
9 Id. 433, 434; 23 Barb. 370; 33 Id. 603; 59 E. C. L. R.
534; 12 Wis. 509, 512; 17 Iowa 413; 11 Ohio St. 190; and we
have also examined the following other authorities, not referred
to by counsel, to wit: S'mith v. llayor of Sacramento, 13 Cal.
531 ; Rornblower v. .Dunden, 35 Cal. 664; Parker v. Ifilliamsburg, 13 How. Pr. 250 ; Carrollv. St. Louis, 12 Mo. 444.
Scarcely one of these authorities is applicable under our
statutes, and to the particular case at bar.
While the language of some of the decisions would seem to
cover this case, yet the precise question involved in this case was
not before the courts rendering such decisions. The cases of
Carroll v. St. Louis, 12 Mo. 444, and Orton v. Te bState, 12
Wis. 509, are as near applicable as any of them.
Before proceeding further, we will say that it will be admitted
that a county is a corporation, or at least a quasi corporation,
and as such could in any case employ counsel, if no counsel had
otherwise been provided for them by law. It will even be admitted, for the purposes of this argument, that in states where no
county attorney is elected, but where a district attorney is elected
for several counties, whose principal duty is to attend to state
cases, to prosecute criminal actions in his district, but whose duty
it also is secondarily to appear and prosecute or defend for the
several counties within his district, such counties are not bound
to depend upon such district attorney, but may employ counsel
of their own to take more especial care of the interest of the
county. It will also be admitted that in any case other counsel
than the county attorney may appear and prosecute or defend for
a county under or for the county attorney, or to assist him, looking of course to the county attorney, if to any one, for compenpensation.
It will also be admitted that a county .may employ other counsel
to perform such of its legal business as the law does not authorize
or require the county attorney to perform, and that there may
be such business will not be denied. And it will also be admitted
that a county may, with the consent of the county attorney,
employ such assistance for the county attorney as the county
attorney. may actually need.
It is possible that there may be other cases where a county may
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employ other counsel than the county attorney, but we now cannot conceive of any other.
The county attorney is elected by the people of the county,
and for the county: Gen. Stat. 283, § 65. He is the counsel for
the county, and cannot be superseded or ignored by the county
commissioners. His retainer and employment is from higher
authority than the county commissioners. The employment of a
general attorney for the county is not by the law put into the
hands of the county commissioners, but is put into the hands of
the people themselves.
The county attorney derives his authority from as high a
source as the county commissioners do theirs, and it would be
about as reasonable to say that the county attorney could employ another board of commissioners to transact the ordinary
business of the county, as it is to say that the county commissioners can employ another attorney to transact the ordinary
legal business of the county. Both would be absurd. It is the
duty of the county attorney to give legal advice to the county
commissioners, and not theirs to furnish legal advice to or for
him.
Some of the provisions of the statute relating to the county
attorney, are as follows. See Gen. Stat. 283 to 286.
"Sect. 186. It shall be the duty of the county attorneys to
appear in the several courts of their respective counties, and
prosecute or defend on behalf of the people all suits, applications
or motions, civil or criminal, arising under the laws of this state,
in which the state or their county is a party interested."
"Sect. 137. Each county attorney shall * * * also prosecute
all civil suits before such magistrate (any magistrate of his
county) "in which the county is a party interested."
"Sect. 138. The county attorneys shall without fee or reward
give opinions and advice to the board of county commissioners,
and other civil officers of their respective counties, when requested
by such board or officers, upon all matters in which the county
or state may have an interest."
"Sect. 139. The county attorneys of the several counties of
the state shall be allowed by the board of county commissioners,
as compensation for their services, a salary as follows * * * In
counties of over twenty-four thousand inhabitants, not more than
three thousand dollars. County attorneys shall be allowed ten
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per cent. on all moneys collected by them in favor of the state
or county." * * *
"Sect. 140. No county attorney shall receive any fee or reward
from or on behalf of any prosecution or other individuals, except
such as are allowed by law for services in any prosecution or business to which it shall be his official duty to attend; nor be concerned as attorney or counsel for either, other than the state or
county, in any civil action, depending upon the same state of
facts upon which any criminal prosecution commenced but undetermined shall depend." * * *
"Sect. 141. The county attorney may appoint a deputy, who
shall perform all the duties of such county attorney during his
absence or sickness."
"Sect. 142. In the absence, sickness, or disability of both the
county attorney and his deputy, any court before whom it is his
duty to appear may appoint an attorney to act as county attorney,
by order to be entered upon the minutes of the court."
What we have said with reference to county attorneys will also
apply to city attorneys. The statutes relating to city attorneys
will be found in the General Statutes as follows: p. 131, § 11; p.
145, § 71; p. 152, § 110, par. 7.
The city attorney receives by law the sum of $1800 per annum
for his services from the city, and while the city council have no
power at all to supersede him, as they have attempted to do in
this case, they cannot even make an additional allowance for the
assistant counsel, unless concurred in by three-fourths of the
members elected to the council: Gen. Stat. 152, § 110, par. 7.
From the foregoing we think it necessarily follows:1. Where a written contract between a county and an individual shows upon its face that it was made by the county, for
the professional services of the individual as an attorney and
counsellor at law, which services are such as the law requires to
be performed by the county attorney, such contract is primd
facie void.
2. When a written contract between a city of the first class
and an individual shows upon its face that it was made by the
city for the professional services of the individual as an attorney
and counsellor at law, which services are such as the law requires
to be performed by the city attorney, such contract is prindfacie
void.
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S. Where the petition of the plaintiff sets forth such a contract
as mentioned above, as a foundation for a decree for the specific
performance of such contract, but does not set forth any facts
which would show that such contract is not void, such petition
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
We suppose it will be conceded that as a rule when a cofitract
appears to be void upon its face, if there should be 'any fact outaide of the contract which would render the contract valid, such
facts should be set forth in the pleading of the party claiming the
contract to be valid. If so, then as said contract appears to be
void, it will devolve upon the plaintiffs to set forth in their petition such facts, if there he any such, as will render the contract
valid.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.
KINGMAN, C. T., concurred.

BREWER, J., did not sit.

United )Statem Circuit Court. District of NYeraska.
JESSE L FROST v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.
Where a servant, under the orders and control of another superior servant, is
directed by the latter to do an act not in the usual course of his duties, and, while
so engaged, is injured by the negligence of the superior, the master is liable to

the servant injured.

•

TuIS was an action brought by the plaintiff to recover damages
for an injury to his minor Fon, resulting in the loss of an arm,
while in the employment of the defendants.
DILLo N, Circuit J., charged the jury as followe:-

Gentlemen of the jury: That the plaintiff's son was employed
by the defendants, and that by an accident his arm was torn off by
machinery in the car shop of the defendants, are facts which are
admitted. Evidence has been offered tending to show that the
defendants, in their works in this city (Omaha), had a ear department outside. Mr. Gamble was the superintendent; that under
him, and having immediate control in the shop, was a foremanMr. Ballou; that under the foreman there were various sets, or,
as witness called them, "gangs of men," under the immediate
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direction and control of some employee or "boss ;" that, among
those having control of a set or gang of men working in the shop,
was a Mr. Collett (named in the petition); that Collett's duty was
to run and superintend the running of a certain machine, or certain machinery, in the shop; that from the time the plaintiff's
son was employed he had been working under Collett, obeying
his orders and directions ; that the chief employment of the son
had been at a moulding-machine, receiving and putting away
mouldings as they came from the machine.
After the son had been thus engaged for some months, the
evidence tends to show that, on the day the accident in question
happened, a belt or band connected with the shaft, some fourteen or sixteen feet high, was off the drum or pulley, and needed
lacing.
It does not very clearly appear, perhaps, whether the belt thus
out of order belonged to the moulding-machine or some other
machine near by; but there is evidence tending to show that it
was within the scope of Collett's duty to see that it was repaired.
The plaintiff has given evidence, which has not on this point been
opposed by any evidence produced by the def6ndant, that, at the
time of the accident, Collett, wishing to lace the band at the end
near the floor, ordered the plaintiff's son, about sixteen years of
age, to ascend a ladder resting on the shaft at the upper end,
which shaft was revolving at the rate of 175 or 200 revolutions
per minute, and hold or keep the band or belt away from the shaft
while he (Collett) laced or sewed it together at or near the floor,
and the right arm of the plaintiff's son, while thus engaged, pursuant to the orders of Collett was cqught, or in some way became
entangled, in the belt, or drawn between it and the shaft, and was
instantly crushed to pieces, and torn from his body.
The plaintiff has offered evidence tending to show that he hired
his son to the defendants to work in the car-shop, making the contract with Mr. Gamble, the superintendent; that at the time Ir.
Gamble went with the son into the shop and directed him, in Mr.
Collett's presence, to help or work under Collett and obey his
orders. Upon the evidence, I do not understand it to be claimed
by the plaintiff that the accident was caused by the defect in the
key (the only defect alleged in the pleadings as to the machinery),
and on the trial no mention has been made as to Collett's general
skill, fitness, and capacity for the performance of the functions or
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duties assigned to him; and the specific ground on which the
recovery is claimed is that Collett, in ordering the plaintiff's son
to ascend the ladder and perform' the service before mentioned,
considering the age of the boy and the nature of the service
required of him (which is claimed by the plaintiff 'to have been
dangerous to life and limb), was guilty of a wrongful and negligent act, which resulted in the injury to the boy, for which this
action is brought.
There is no statute in the state of Nebraska relating to the
liability of masters to servants, and the rules regulating such
liability must be found in the general principles of the law as
declared and settled by the courts. One of these principles, too often decided to be now denied, is
that a master is not liable to his servant or employee for the negligence of a fellow-servant while engaged in the same common
employment or service, unless he has been negligent in the selection of the servant in fault, which is a question, as before observed, not in this case. And this doctrine has been extended
by many courts to all persons seiving the same master and under
his control, whether equal, inferior, or superior in grade to the
person or servant injured, and the fact that the injured servant
)vas under the control of the servant by whose negligence the
injury was caused, has been considered to make no difference in
the application of the rule. Although the rule, particularly this
extension of it so as to exempt a master for the negligence of a
servant, under the scope of his employment, who has the control
of another servant, for an injury to the latter, caused by his
obeying the orders of his superior, has met with much, and I
must say, in my judgment, just and reasonable opposition, yet it
has been so often and so generally decided that it is doubtful
whether or how far a court, whatever may be its convictions, is
at liberty tb disregard it. But I do feel free to refuse to extend
the rule to cases t 9 which the reason on which it rests does not
apply. The reason of the doctrine is that a servant or employee,
in making his contract, must be presumed to take into account all
the ordinary risks of the business, or risks on which he proposes
to enter and obtain a compensation which, upon the average,
covers these risks, among which are included the negligence of
fellow-servants in the same employment, but he is not presumed
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"to take into account a risk not included in his employment, ana)
which, therefore, he has no reason to anticipate.
a
" In deciding this case you should determine the nature of the
employment on which the plaintiff engaged that his son should
serve. If you find that his contract of service' or the duties
which he engaged to perform were such that it was within the
contract or within the scope of those duties that the son should
assist in the repair of the machinery in question, and that the
son, when injured, was in the discharge of a duty or service
covered by the contract of employment, then the company is not
liable for the negligence of Collett (if he was negligent) with
respect to ordering the son to ascend the ladder and hold the
belt away from the shaft.
BUt I draw this distinction: If the work which the son was
ordered by Collett to do was not within the contract of service;
was not one of the duties which fell within the contract of employment, but was outside of it, then Collett in ordering the service
in question (if he was in the scope and course of his duties and
power at the time) must, as to this act, be taken to represent the
company (which he is presumed to constructively represent), and
if that act was wrongful and negligent, as hereinafter defined,
the company, his employer, would be liable for the damages
caused by such negligent and wrongful act; and the principle
before adverted to that the master is not liable for the neglect of
a co-employee in the same service has no application, or no just
application to such a case; for in such a case they are not, in
my judgment, in any proper sense "fellow-servants" in the same
common service.
This action is based essentially upon the alleged negligence of
Collett, and the negligence imputed consists in the nature of the
order which he gave the plaintiff's son. If, under the foregoing
instructions, you find that the company is liable in respect of the
act of Collett in ordering the boy up to the shaft, you will then
have to inquire whether that act was wrongful and negligent.
Now, gentlemen, that depends upon the circumstances of the
case, which you should attentively consider.
An employer is not an insurer of the lives and limbs of his
men, but he does impliedly engage that he will not expose them
to unnecessary and unreasonable risks to life, or serious bodily
injury. Negligence is the omission to do something which a rea-
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sonable, prudent man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do
under all the circumstances surrounding and characterizing the
particular case; and in this case it is the duty of the jury to
consider the age and experience and extent of judgment of the
boy, and the nature of the service demanded of him, in respect to
its being hazardous to life or limb or otherwise.
If a reasonable and ordinarily prudent man would not have
ordered a boy of his age, under the circumstances, upon such a
service, because it was dangerous, then it was a negligent and
wrongful act; but if it could not by a man of reasonable prudence
and sagacity have been foreseen, that the service demanded was
perilous, the company is not liable, although the act required of
the boy was one not falling within the scope of his employment.
This is an action by the father for loss of service of the son,
and under the pleading he can only recover pecuniary damages,
which includes actual or necessary expenditures, for supplies for
the son during his recovery; the value of his and his family's
necessary attention to the son, and the value of the loss of the
services of the son from the date of the accident down to the
time of trial.

Gourt of Oommon Pleas of the City of JNew York.
THE PASSAIC MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. WILLIAM

HOFFMAN

XT AL.

Under the Statute of Frauds a distinction is made between a contract for the
sale of goods and one for work and labor in the manufacture of them. The
former only is made void by the statute-unless it be in writing.
Where the contract is for an article coming under the general denomination
of goods, wares, or merchandise, and is made with one who makes and sells that
kind of article to all who traffic in it, the quantity required and-the price being
agreed upon, it is a contract of sale, whether the maker and vendor has the
required quantity on hand or has to make it afterwards.
But if what is contemplated by the agreement is the skill, labor, care, or knowledge of the maker; or if it would not have been produced except for the order;
or if it is ordered at a certain price with the knowledge that the maker is not
supplied and will have to make it; or if, when produced, it is unfitted for sale as
a general article of merchandise, being adapted only for use by the person ordering it, then the contract is one for work and labor, and not within the statute.
The cases on this subject examined and discussed by DALY, C. J.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
DALY, 0. J.-Thc first question and indeed the main one in this case
is whether the contract upon which the action was brought was void by
the Statute of Frauds. It involves these inquiries: 1st. Whether the
contract was one within the statute. 2d. If it were whether there was
a sufficient note or memorandum in writing; and 3d. Whether there
was that partial delivery and acceptance of a portion of the goods which
the statute requires.
What the statute has in terms declared void is every contract for the
sale of goods, chattels, or things in action for the price of $50 or more
unless there has been a partial delivery and acceptance, or a payment
of some part of the purchase-money or a memorandum in writing subscribed by the parties; but simple as this enactment is the greatest
difficulty has been experienced in determining in many cases what is a
contract for the sale of goods and chattels within the meaning of this
provision.
At an early peri6d a distinction was made between a contract for the
sale of an article and one for the fabrication or manufacture of it; the
latter in general terms being regarded as a contract for work and labor
and not a contract for sale, though the article when manufactured and
ready for delivery would, as a personal chattel, come under the denomination of goods, wares or merchandise. Thus where a party contracts
for the production of something in which the skill and labor of the
person who fabricates it is combined with the material which he employs,
as in the production of a statue or of a painting in which the material
is comparatively unimportant and the skill and labor is the chief ingredient, it was regarded as a contract for work and labor and not for the
sale of the painting or the statue, even though the price to be paid had
been previously agreed upon.
In the case here put by way of illustration the distinction is obvious;
but there are many contracts in which work or labor has to be performed
after the contract is entered into, which are in their inception contracts
of sale and do not lose that character because work and labor has to be
executed to perform them.
Work and labor may be necessary in the delivery of the thing sold, or to
put it in a condition for delivery, which is very different from where it
is bestowed in the creation or production of the article contracted for.
But even in the latter case the contract may be in its nature one of
sale.
It is a matter of every day occurrence that contracts are made for the
purchase at a fixed price of a certain quantity of goods from those who
manuftcture them for the general purpose of sale as an article of traffic,
which the manufacturer is not able at the time to supply but which he
undertakes to furnish by a given time, or as soon as that quantity can
be manufactured, which have been regarded as essentially contracts of
sale within the meaning of the statute, and as fully within the mischief
which it was intended to guard against as if the article had existed in
solido when the contract was made for the sale of it.
But where the contract is for the production of an article of a peculiar kind, or it is the skill, labor, care, or knowledge of the person or
manufacturer who is to produce it, which is relied upon, then it is the
manufacturing which is the chief ingredient and which in this country
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at least is regarded as making it a contract for work and labor, and not
one for the sale of the article.
It is, however, sometimes very difficult to determine whether the contract is simply for the product itself as an article of trade, or for the
peculiar skill, care, or knowledge which is to be bestowed in the productioti of it.
The case now before us is one that involves that inquiry, and as there
has been considerable conflict in the authorities as to what is or is not
a contract of sale within the meaning of the statute, it will be necessary
to inquire into the present state of the law, and amid the conflict of
adjudged cases ascertain the rules that now govern in the interpretation
of the statute.
It may be stated, as the result of several well-considered ca~es, that
where .the. contract is for an article coming under the general denomination of goods, wares, or merchandise, and it is made with one who
manufactures and sells that kind of commodity to all who traffic in it,
the quantity required and the price being agreed upon, it is a contract
of sale, and that it in no way affects the character of the contract in
such a case, whether the manufacturer and vendor has when the oider
is given the requisite quantity on hand or has to manufacture it afterwards, Gardner v. Joy, 9 Mete. 179; Lamb v. Crofts, 12- Id. 356 ;
Atwater v. Howe, 29 Conn. 508; Eichelberger v. McCauley, 5 Har. &
Johns. 213; Cason v. Chuly, 6 Geo. 514; Garbertv. Watson, 5 Barn.
& Ald. 613 ; Smith v. Surnam, 9 Barn. & Cress. 561 ; Watts v. Friend,
'10 Id. 446; Wilks v. Atkinson, 6 Taunt. 11; Jackson v. Covert, 5
Wend. 140; Smith v. N. Y. Gen. Railroad Co., 4 Keyes 180.
But if what is clearly contemplated by the agreement is the skill,
labor, care, or knowledge of the one who fabricates the article, or if it
would not have been produced if the order had not been given for it,
or if, when produced, it is unfitted for sale as a general article of merchandise, being adapted only for use by the person ordering it, then the
contract is one for work and labor, and is not within the statute: Spencer v. Cone, 1 Met. 283; Mixer v. Howarth, 21 Pick. 207; Hight v.
Ripley, 19 Malue 139; Cumming v. Dennet, 26 Id. 401; Allen v. Jarvis, 20 Conn. 88; Cason v. Chuly, 6 Geo. 554; Crookshanks v. Burrill, 18 Johns. 59; Cartwright v. Stewart, 19 Barb. 455 ; Parker v.
Srhenck, 28 Id. 38; Mead v. Case, 33 Id. 202; Clay v. Gates, 1
Hurl. & Norm. 73.
The distinctions here presented as tests to determine whether a contract is or is not within this provision of the statute, though founded,
as I have said, upon the authority of well-considered cases, have not
been very closely adhered to in this state, there being several decisions
in our reports in which contracts have been upheld as contracts for work
and labor, not upon the ground that what was contemplated was the
skill and labor of the one who was to furnish the article, but because the article was not in solido when the contract was entered into, but
was to be made afterwards, either in whole or in part, from the raw
material.
Thus, in Sewel.v. Fitch, 8 Cow. 215, an order was given to the
plaintiffs' agent in this city for 300 casks of Thames cut nails, at 5
cents per pound, and the agent having stated when the order was.
received that the plaintiffs had not that quantity on hand but that it
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could soon be made and obtained from the plaintiffs' manufactory in
Norwich, Conn., it was held not to be a contract for sale, but for work
and labor.
The contract in this case of Sewell v. Fitch might perhaps have been
sustained upon the ground that "Thames cut nails" was an article of a
peculiar kind which the plaintiffs manufactured, or one the distinctive
quality or especial excellence of which may have been owing to the
skill, ingenuity, or experience of the manufacturers; but this was not
the reason given by the court, nor, so far as indicated by the report,
was there anything in the case except the sp cific name, "Thames cut
nails," to distinguish the particular article from nails in general.
Sewell v. Fitch was followed in the still more doubtful case of Down
v. Ross, 23 Wend. 270, BRONSON, J., dissenting, in which a contract
for a certain number of bushels of wheat, at 10 shillings per bushel,
was upheld upon the ground that- a part of it was then unthrashed,
which the vendor agreed to get ready, as well as to give the whole of it
a second cleaning, and deliver the entire quantity by a specified day; a
case, however, which must now be regarded as repudiated since the
recent decision of the Court of Appeals in Smith v. The N Y. Cen.
Railroad Co, 4 Keyes 199, in which a contract for a quantity of wood
at a certain price per cord, which was thereafter to be cut from standing
trees, measured into cords, and delivered at a railroad station, was held
to be a contract of sale within the meaning of the statute, and not one
for work and labor.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Sewell v. Fitch, though regarded as erroneous, was followed by the Superior Court of this city in
an analogous case, in Robertson v. Vaughn, 5 Sandf. 1. The court
adhered to it simply because it had been decided for many years,
and had doubtless been followed in numerous instances by inferior
tribunals in the state, and under these circumstances it was thought
better that the error involved in the decision should be left to be corrected by the court of last resort.
It was also followed in Donovan v. Wilson, 26 Barb. 138, the same
reason being assigned, that the error should be corrected by the Court
of Appeals.
These reasons are now no longer of any weight, the decision of the
Court of Appeals in Smith v. N. Y. Cen. Railroad Co., supra, being
directly in conflict with the construction put upon the statute in Sewell
v. Fitch.
A brief review of a few cases will suffice to illustrate the construction
given to the statute.
Thus, the early and much-discussed case of Towers v. Osborne, 1
Strange 506, the report of which simply states that the defendant be" spoke a chariot and when it was made refused to take it, has been upheld on the ground that the chariot which was ordered to be made would
never, but for that order, have had any existence: per ABBOTT, C. J.,
in Watson v. Garbut, 5 Barn. & Ald. 613, which WOODRUFF. J., considered an extreme case, that ought not to be carried any further: per
WOODRUFF, J., in Smith v. N . Cen. Railroad Co., spra. But in
.Mixer v. Ilowarth, 21 Pick. 207, where all that was done by the defendant was to select the lining which was put upon the carriage, it was held
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not to be a contract for sale of the carriage within the meaning of the
statute.
An analogous case to both of these was Crookshanks v. Burrill, 18
Johns. 58, in which the plaintiff contracted to male the woodwork of a
wagon for which the defendant was to pay in lambs at a certain price
per head, which was held not to be within the statute.
In Parkerv. Schenck, 28 Barb. 38, the defendant directed a pump
to be manufactured in a peculiar way so as to adapt it to a use to which
he meant to apply it, which was deemed sufficient to make it a contract
for work and labor.
In Parsons v. Louck, 4 Robertson 216, the agreement was for the
manufacture thereafter, of ten tons of paper at a specified price per
pound; the paper to be of a particular description, and of such sizes and
weight3 as the defendant should thereafter direct by letter, which was
also hcld to be a contract for work and labor.
Analogous to this was the case of Right v. Ripley, 19 Maine 139,
where the plaintiff was to furnish a quantity of malleable hoe-shanks
according to pattern left with him, in which a like decision was rendered.
In Mead v. Case, 33 Barb. 202, the defendant selected a marble
monument, consisting of several parts, which were put together, and
which were standing in the plaintiff's yard or shop. By the defendant's
instruction the monument was polished, and an inscription cut upon
it embracing the names of the defendant's deceased father, mother and
sister, that it might be put as a memorial over their place of burial.
This was held not to be within the statute. E. DARWIN SMITH, J.,
dissented in an elaborate opinion, but the decision was clearly correct,
as the monument, when the epitaph or inscription which the defendant
desired, was cut upon it, was fit only for use in that state as a memorial
to indicate the burial-place of the defendant's relatives. It was converted into a thing capable of being used only by himself or by his
connections, and in that state was unavailable to the plaintiff-for sale as
an article of merchandise.
To illustrate what is within the statute, the case of Cason v. Chuly,
6 Geo. 554, may be cited, in which the agreement was for a crop of cotton to be delivered as soon as it could be gathered and prepared for
market. The court held it to be a contract of sale and not of work and
labor, for, said the court, the work and labor would have been bestowed
in the production of the article, if the contract had not been made, and
they distinguished it from the making or production of an article
unsuited to the general market, likening it to the case of the manufacture of goods wherein the manufacturer does not necessarily lose the
result of his labor, for the reason that if the purchaser does not take the
goods, others will. And to the like effect are the cases of Garbut v.
Watson, 1 Dow. & Ry. 219; 5 B. & Ald. 613; Smith v. Surman, 9 B.
& C 561; Watts v. Friend, 10 Id. 446; Lamb v. Grofts, 12 Met. 356;
Wilks v. Atkinson, 6 Taunt. 11; Smith vN. Y. CentralRailroad Co.,
4 Keyes 180.
In Atwater v. Hfough, 29 Conn. 508, it was held that a contract for
100 sewing-machines, part of which were not finished, but which were to
be completed and delivered in the course of the summer, was a contract
of sale within the meaning of the statute, and the same construction
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was put upon the contract in Gardner v. Jo, 9 'Met. 179, in which
the defendant asked the plaintiff his price for candles, and the plaintiff named it. The defendant then ordered 100 boxes, upon which the
plaintiff replied that the candles were not then manufhctured, but that
he would manufacture and deliver them in the course of the summer.
and this was held not to be an agreement for work and labor but a contract of sale. This is what may be called a very close case as well as the
one that. precedes it, Atwater v. Hough, supra, both of which, however,
should be distinguished by the fact that it does not appear in the report
of either case that it was anypartof the bargain that the vendor should
manufacture the article contracted for: Browne on the Statute of Frauds
807; Eichelbergerv. .MNcCauley, 5 Har. & John. 213. This fact was especially relied upon as distinguishing the agreement for the manufacture
of the malleable hoe shanks in Hight v. Riple, 19 Maine 137, from an
ordinary contract of sale, the court remarking that in contracts like the
one before them "the person ordering the article to be manufactured is
under no obligation to receive as good or even! a better one of the like
kind purchased from another, and not made for him. It is the peculiar
labor and skill of the other party combined with the materials for which
he contracted, and to which he is entitled," and in a later case in the
same state, Cummings v. Dement, 26 Maine 401, the distinction is laid
down more broadly in these words: "If the application is made to a
manufacturer or mechanic for articles in his line of business, and he
undertakes to prepare and furnish them by a tived time, such a contract, though not in writing, is not affected by the statute," and Chief
Justice SHAW, by whom the opinion of the court was delivered in
Gardner v. Joy, supra, in a later case, Lamb v. Crofts, 12 Met. 356,
declared the distinction to be as follows :-" Where a person stipulates
for the future sale of articles which he is habitually making, and which
at the time are not made or finished, it is essentially
y a contract of sale
I•
and not a contract for work and labor. Otherwise where the article is
made pursuant to the agreement." The distinction here drawn serves to
explain and limit the previous decision of the same court in Gardner
v. Joy, su2pra, but as a rule it is not very clear or very satisfactory.
It may be stated as a conclusion to be derived from these cases that
if an order is given to a manufacturer for a certain quantity at a certain
price of an article which he is habitually manufacturing and keeps on
hand to supply orders, it is in general terms to be regarded as a contract of sale, and should be in writing to make it binding, for the party
giving such an order is not called upon to inquire what quantity the
manufacturer has on hand or whether it will or will not be necessary to
manufacture it in whole or in part to fulfil the order.
But if, with the knowledge that the manufacturer is not supplied
with the article ready made, the party orders a certain article to be
manufactured at a certain price, then it is an agreement for the production of the article and not for the sale of it, after it is produced ; for
it may be that but for the order the manufacturer would not at that
time, in the ordinary prosecution of his business, manufacture such a
quantity, for the reason that it may, by the time it is manufactured and
ready for delivery, depreciate in value in the market as was the fact in
the case now before us. ".Ex seguo et bono," says NESBETT, J., in
Cason v. C3udy, supra, ,"a man who agrees to bestow his labor in the
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manufacture of goods for a price, and which price he must lose unless
the goods are received by him who ordered them, ought to be paid, and
a statute which would protect the purchaser from liability in such a
case would be alike impossible and unjust." It might be answered that
the mechanic or manufacturer can protect himself by having the contract put in writing, but that is evading the inquiry, the question being,
whether the statute in terms includes such a case, and in my judgment
it does not.
"It would," says ROBERTSON, C. J., in Parsons v. Louck, supra, "1be
a somewhat novel and startling doctrine to decide that a tradesman
must have every contract put in writing with his customers to manufacture articles of dress or furniture, in order to bind the latter to pay for
them," and yet the statute has been carried to this extent in a recent
decision in England, Lee v. Grff n, 1 E., B. & E. 272, in which it
was held that an agreement for the making of a set of artificial teeth, to
be fitted to the mouth of the person ordering them, was not an agreement for work and labor, but a contract of sale, and was void for not
being in writing.
Indeed of late years the judges, 9specially in England, with the
design, as they express it, of bringing the statute back to its true interpretation, are disposed to go to such lengths- in holding cases to be
within it, that its construction is in a fair way of becoming now more
uncertain than ever.
"I do not," says CROMPTON, J.,; in this case of the artificial teeth,
"igree to the proposition that the value of the skill and labor as compared to that of the material supplied, is any criterion by which to
decide whether the contract is for work and labor or for the sale of a
chattel. It bears a strong resemblance to that of a tailor supplying a
coat, the measurement of the mouth and the fitting of the teeth being
analogous to the measurement and the fitting of a garment."
HILl, J., went farther: "Whenever a contract is entered into," he
says, "for the manufacture of a chattel, then the subject-matthr of the
contract is the sale and delivery, of the chattel, and the party supplying
it cannot recover for work and labor." A conclusion which if followed
would overturn a number of American cases-indeed every one that I
have cited in which the contract was held not to be within the statute.
Justice BLACKBURN, who also concurred in this judgment, undertook
to lay down a rule to distinguish what was and.what was not within
the statute, or rather what was a contract of sale as distinguished from
one for work and labor. ' "If the contract be such," he says, "that
when carried out it would result in the sale of a chattel, the party cannot sue for work and labor; but if the result of the contract is that the
party has done work and labor which results in nothing that can become
the subject of sale, the party canfiot sue for goods sold and delivered."
He gives the case before the court of the artificial teeth as an illustration of the first part of this rule, and of the second the case of an
attorney employed to prepare a deed, in which case he says, "it cannot
be said that the paper and ink he uses in the preparation of the deed
are goods sold and delivered."
The effect of the rule here laid down is to convert every case of work
and labor int9 a contract of sale if the result of the work and labor be
a product or movable thing which is capable of transfer by delivery, a
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construction, in my judgment, unwarranted by the language which was
used in the enactment of the Statute of Frauds and the sense in which
the language was interpreted by judicial decision for more than a century and a half.
What the statute declared must be in writing to be valid, was any
contract for the sale of goods, wares, or merchandise for the price of
101. or upwards.
What was meant by these words goods, wares and merchandise at the
time of their enactment, not simply their etymological meaning, but
what was understood by them in their popular and in their legal sense,
may be ascertained by referring to the English dictionaries by which
they were first defined.
They are not to be found in the earlier works for the reason that the
first English dictionaries were limited to the explanation of foreign or
unusual words, or as expressed in their titles they were "Expositors" or
"Interpreters of Hard Words."
The earliest work in which the meaning of words in ordinary and
popular use was given is "Phillips's New World of Words," the first
edition of which appeared twenty years before the passage of the Statute
of Frauds. In this work (I quote from the sixth edition which appeared after the passage of the statute), the meaning of the word merchandise is given as follows: " Commodities or goods to trade with."
And this exact definition is given in the succeeding dictionaries of
Kersey, Martin and Bailey.
It is said in the Glossographia Anglicana .ova that the word came
into use as a term to distinguish the goods and wares exposed to sale in
fairs and markets, which is affirmed also in Cowell's Law Interpreter,
edition of 1708.
The word "wares" is defined for the first time in Cotgroves' Dictionary 1632 as "merchandise," and in Phillips' New World of Words as
"merchandise commodity," and this is the definition successively given
to it down to the time of Johnson, showing that up to the middle of
the last century it was regarded as having exactly the same meaning as
merchandise, and indeed such would seem to have been the understanding of Johnson, who defines it "commonly something to be sold."
The first exposition I have found of the word "goods" is in Bailey's
large dictionary of 1732, who defines it simply," merchandise," and by
Johnson, who followed as the next lexicograpber, it is defined to be
"movables in a house, personal or movable estate, wares, freight, merchandise."
The revised statutes substituted the word "!chattels" for "wares or
merchandise," but like many other changes of- language in the revision,
this was evidently for conciseness and not with a view of changing the
sense. See note to Rev. Stat. pp. 84-85.
The lexicographers and other authorities cited show that what was
understood by the words goods, wares and merchandise when the statute
was enacted and for a century afterwards, were the commodities bought
and sold in trade and commerce, which would not include a set of artificial teeth, as they are not bought and sold in that way, but made only
for the person ordering them.
There is no very material difference between the dentist who removes
the decayed teeth and replaces them with an artificial set which he
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makes and adapts to the mouth of the particular person, and the surgeon
who replaces a broken limb or performs any of those operations by which
a lost or decayed part of the human body is replaced, as to restore the
nose when it has been lost, by skilfully drawing the skin down from the
forehead and by that operation constructing a new nose of the shape
and appearance of the former one. They are both acts of work and
labor, and to call either of them contracts of sale is to ignore the distinction which separates an agreement for work and labor from a contract
for the sale of a thing. There is nothing in a set of artificial teeth
which the dentist fabricates for the mouth of the person who orders
them that is capable of sale in the ordinary course of trade or commerce, unless it should be the materials of which they are composed,
and this may be said of Justice BLACKBURN'S illustration of the deed
which the attorney draws, as the paper upon which it is written is capable at least of sale for use in the paper-mill. In fact it has been held'
in this country that the paper upon which a deed or note is written
makes it a chattel, irrespective of what is written upon it, so as to bring
it within the words of a statute authorizing suits to compel the delivery
of "goods and chattels:" Mills v. Gore, 320Met.
Pick.367.
28; Clap. v. Sh Williams,
hard,23 Id. 228; Baldwin v.
"The case of the ordering of the chariot, Towers v. Osborne, 1 Str.
506, appears to be the first reported case under the 17th section of the
statute. The contract there was held not to be within it for the reason
that the enactment meant only contracts for the actual sale of goods
where the buyer, is immediately answerable without time given him by
special agreement and the seller is to deliver the goods immediately.
This case was decided within fifty years after the passage of the statute,
and Lord LOUGHBOROUGH in 'commenting upon it in Ron leau v. Wyatt,
2 H. Bl. 67, said: "that it was plainly out of the statute, because it
was for work and labor to be done and materials and things to be found,
w'iich is different from a mere contract of sale to which species of contract alone the statute is applicable."

Here the line of separation is clearly marked, affording a broad distinguishing rule which was recognised and acted upon for more than a.
century after the passage of the act.
Indeed this was understood to be the proper construction of the statute,
and to be the law both in this country and in England thirty years ago
by a jurist so careful, aequrate and eminent as Chancellor KENT, who
in the text of his Commentaries says: "That if the subject of the contract does not exist in rerum natura at the time of the contract, but
remains thereafter to be fabricated out of the raw materials or materials
not put together, it is consequently incapable of delivery and not within
the statute."
And subsequently, in a note, after examining the English and American authorities, he deduced from them what he supposed to be the rule
as follows: "If the article sold exists at the time in solido and is capa.
ble of delivery, the contract is within the statute; but if the article is
to be afterwards manufactured or prepared by work and labor for de
livery, the contract is not :" 2 Kent's Com. 504, 511, n., 4th ed. A rule
which had at least the merit of a well defined distinction easily understood and which could be readily applied; but which in the reactionary
Vol. XX.-8
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movement that has since taken place, has even in this country been materially departed from.

In the early part of the last century a question arose whether stock
or shares in a mining company were goods, wares, or merchandise within
the meaning of the 17th section, and the ground upon which the objection was raised that merchants trafficked in stocks, and at that time, 1725,
very largely, may be adverted to as explanatory of the meaning that
was there attached to these words.
The point was not then determined, the judges being equally divided,
and it remained unsettled in England until about thirty years ago, when
it was finally decided that stocks were not goods, wares or merchandise
within the statute, because, said the Vice-Chancellor, Sir LAUNCELOT
SHADWELL (Duncraft v. Albrecht, 11 Sim. 198), "Goods, wares or merchandise are capable of being in part delivered. If there is an agreement to sell a quantity of tallow or hemp you may deliver a part, but
the delivery of a part is not a transaction applicable, as I apprehend, to
such a subject as railway shares." And this deision was affirmed by
the Lord Chancellor.
Stocks bought and sold by oral agreement are as fully within the evil
which the statute meant to suppress as the making of a set of artificial
teeth could be, and if the reason which exceps the former from the
operation of the statute is that they are incapable of delivery in part, it
equally applies to a set of artificial teeth, or any other separate or entire
thing which cannot be delivered in part.
This ground of exception, the incapability of a partial delivery, has
been distinctly repudiated in this country, and it has been held in Massachusetts and Connecticut that stocks or shares in an incorporated company are embraced by the words goods, wares and merchandise, that
there is nothing in the nature of stocks or shares which in reason or
sound policy should exempt contracts respecting them from the opera.
tion of the statute; that so large an amount of lroperty is now invested
in them, and as the ordinary indi ia of property arising from delivery
cannot take place there is a peculiar reason for extending the provisions
of the statute to them; that the circumstance that they cannot be actually accepted and received is not at all conclusive, and would be a narrow and forced construction of the statute: Rsdale v. Harris,20 Pick.
13; North v. Forrest,15 Conn. 401; and see Calvin v. Williams, 3
Har. & J. 38. So that the grounds upon which the English Court of
Chancery in the cases cited, and the common law courts in Bumble v.
Mitchell, 11 Ad. & E. 205; Raseltine v. Singers, 1 Wels., Hurl. & Gord.
836, and Tempest v. Kilner, 3 Mann., Gr. & Sc, 204, held that stocks
were not within the statute, is relied upon in the American cases as an
especial reason why they should be included.
It has been decided in Maine that the sale of a promissory note is
within the statute, and in New Hampshire that it is not: Gooch v. Williams, 41 Maine 523; Whitemore v. Gibbs, 4 Foster 402.
It has been held in England that the sale of a patent right, a very
impnrtant species of property at the present day, ,is not within the statute: Chanter v. Dickinson, 5 Man. & G. 253; whilst, if the decision
in the New England cases I have cited is to be followed, it certainly
would be.
This state of things, in respect to the construction and meaning of a
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provision in a statute which has been in existence for nearly two centuries, is not very satisfactory, in view of what has been the experience
of the past respecting it. "No act," says Mr. Evans in his notes to the
collection of the statutes, "has been productive of greater litigation in
settling its construction." Daines Barrington said seventy-five years ago
that it was the common impression then that it had not been expounded
at a less expense than one hundred thousand pounds; and Chancellor
KENT, about forty years afterwards, was of the opinion that it had then
cost upwards of a million pounds sterling. Lord NOTTINGHAM thought
every line of it worth a subsidy, but he was the father of the act or
claimed the merit of having brought in the bill : Ash v. Abdy, 3 Swanst.
664; whilst Lord MANSFIELD considered that important provisions in
it, which ought to be plain to the meanest capacity, lacked the certainty
requisite to make them plain to the greatest capacity: Cadogan v. Kenvett, Cowp. 434; and certainly the exposition which -has here been
given of the inconsistency and conflict that now exist as to what was
meant by a contract for the sale of goods, wares, and merchandise, either
brings this provision under the reproval of Lord 'MANSFIELD's observation, or shows the folly of disturbing the construction so long given to
these words.
- The judges who were first called upon to interpret them were as competent as any of their successors, and as well, if not better, informed of
the mischief the statute was intended to remedy.
"Great regard," says CoKE, "ought, in construing a statute, to be
paid to the construction which the sages of the law who lived about the
time or soon after it was made put upon it; because they were best able
to judge of the intention of the makers at the time when it was made :"
Dwarris 693; an opinion which before his day had been compressed
into an axiom: "Contemporavea expositio est optima etfortissima in leye."
Chief Justice BEST said in Proctor v. Jones, 2 C. & P. 532, that the
Statute of Frauds was much objected to at the time of its passage, and
that the judges appeared anxious to get rid of it, but in later times became desirous to give to it its full effect, and this loose statement made
upon a trial at nisi prius, has recently been followed up -byJustice E.
DAwIN SMITH, in Mead v. Cole, 33 Barb. 206, who says, "The English
court started off and long continued in the practice, if not in the theory,
of regarding the statute unfavorably, and its simple text was persistently
for many years nullified perverted, or evaded by numerous decisions."
No reference is made by either of these judges to any authority for
this statement, and I have looked in vain over the contemporary period
for anything to corroborate it. Chief Justice BEST made the remark
above quoted a century and a half after the statute was passed. He
could have no bitter means of information than we possess, and so far
from finding either of these statements sustained, the result of my examination convinces me that the judges interpreted the statute in no
hostile spirit whatever, buL experienced great difficulty in understanding
some of its provisions, from what is now conceded to have been the imperfect manner in which the act was drawn; and it is difficult to see
why they should seek to "evade and nullify" the seventeenth section
when the effect of having contracts in writing was greatly to abridge
their own labors by relieving them of the difficulties incident to interpreting agreements founded only upon parol testimony.
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The courts of equity have also been assailed for invading the statute,
because they compelled the performance of parol agreemcnts where the
agreement is admitted by the defendant in his answer. But courts of
equity exercised this jurisdiction upon the ground that as the statute,
as was expressed in its title, was "1An Act for prevention of Frauds and
Perjuries," there could be no danger of fraud or perjury when the defendant admitted the agreement: Lynmenson v. Ticeed, Prec. in Ch. 374.
But this was denied in the law courts by Lord LouGooonuG, upon
the ground that compelling the party to answer put him under a great
temptation to commit perjury by denying the agreement, and upon the
further ground that the prevention of perjury was not the sole object
of the act, but " to lay down a clear and positive rule for determining
when the contract of sale was complete to prevent confusion and uncertainty in the transactions of mankind," which was adding an intention
by interpretation, for the preamble of the act is in these words :"For prevention of many fraudulent practices which are commonly
endeavored to be upheld by perjury andsubornation of perjury, be it enacted, &c. : 29 Car. 2, c. 3; which would seem alike to be a very clear
indication of the purpose for which it was passed, and the mischief it
was designed to remedy, and as far as it is relied on is an answer to both
But weight was given
of the grounds taken by Lord LOUGHBOROUGr.
by courts of equity to these grounds for insisting upon the application
of the statute, and the rule as first acted upon was modified by holding
that notwithstanding the admission, the defendant might insist upo) the
statute and then defeat any recovery upon the agreement, and though this
seems to be very inconsistent, the rule as thus modified, is now regarded
as impregnably settled by authority: Browne on Statute of Frauds,
§ 498, 2-3.
The rule in equity is at least settled. But in the courts of law, especially in the English courts, the important provision of the statute respecting contracts of sale, is as fully thrown open for judicial consideration and discussion as it was in the beginning; and what the
community have a right to expect, some stability in the construction
of an enactment affecting all engaged in trade or commerce, or who follow those handicrafts in which their labor and skill is combined with
the material they use, would seem to be regarded as of little consequence. Under a system like ours, in which the rights of individuals
are determined by positive rules and the authority of adjudged cases,
itis of more importance that a rule of construction should be stable
than that it should be logically correct, and if it is to be constantly
fluctuating and uncertain, as appears now to be the tendency in regard
to the provision respecting sales, it were as well to be relieved from
the authority of precedents altogether, and follow the nations that
adhere to the system of the civil law.
This disposition to extend the operation of the section respecting sales
over what may be regarded as at least doubtful or uncertain cases, arises
from the desire to give to the statute greater effect, as I judge from the
high eulogiums pronounced by judges upon the wisdom and policy of its
provisions. It is not the province of judges to expound a statute according to their opinion of its wisdom and utility, but to declare what was
enacted, what was the meaning and intention of the framers of the
act; and when that has been ascertained by judicial decisions long

PASSAIC MANUFACTURING CO. v. HOFFM

.

acquiesced in, courts are not warranted in disturbing it upon the ground
that greater effect ought to be given to the statute. This is not interpretation, but judicial legislation; and the only excuse that could be
made for it is the one now given, that the judges would not, after the
passage of the statute, carry it out or give effect to its provisions; which,
so far as I can learn, has been assumed only from the construction put
at the present day upon their decisions. It certainly cannot be applied
to Lord LOUGOBOROUGH, who, in distinguishing the ease of the order-%
ing of the chariot as one of work and labor and therefore not within
the statuteJ took especial occasion to commend the wisdom of the provision therein respecting sales.
If this reactionary movement grows out of the belief that it will tend
to coerce men in a greater degree to put their contracts in writing, it is
a vain expectation; for in the complicated and rapid transaction of business at the present day men have neither the disposition nor the time
to put all they agree to in writing. Large commercial transactions are
entered into and consummated every day upon oral agreements that
could not be legally enforced, the only effect of the statute being to keep
such contracts out of the courts, and to leave them to the good faith and
integrity of the parties.
Whatever opinion may be entertained of the beneficial working of
this provision of the statute as a general regulation, its effect in the
courts is not to augment or promote commercial morality in particular instances; for, in my long experience in presiding at the trial of
causes, I have almost invariably seen it resorted to to defeat a contract
or engagement fairly entered into when, by reason of the depreciation
in value of the thing ordered, or like cause, it was found convenient to
get rid of the obligation. And if the statute is to be carried now by
judicial construction to the extent of declaring, unless it is in writing,
every engagement absolutely void to make or pay for a thing the possession or transfer of which can pass by delivery-if this is to enter into
and govern in all the transactions of every-day life, to every article
ordered or requisite in the supply of our wants, necessities, or luxuries,
then it is prescribing as a condition to the validity of the transaction
what is simply impracticable, what will not and cannot be complied
with, and the great bulk of such transactions will be practically left to
the integrity of the parties, and the statute invoked in aid of those who
wish to get rid of their engagements.
If, as we have a right to presume from the preamble, the object of
the statute was to prevent fraud and perjuries, and, as a means to that
end, contracts of sale were not allowed to be established by oral testimony because it was a kind of evidence that could be readily fabricated
and otherwise defective and uncertain, it is to be remembered that the
rules which regulate the introduction, the bearing, and the weight of
testimony were not then as well understood as they are now.
Baron GIBERT's treatise upon the law of evidence was not published until three-quarters of a century after the passage of the statute,
and even that treatise, though extravagantly eulogized by Blackstone, is
characterized now as a "very meagre production :" Marvin Legal Bib.
334. And hoW little the tests which are now every day applied to
parol evidence were then understood, resorted to, or allowed, is familiar
to every one who has perused the State Trials.
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As a means of preventing frauds and perjuries, the statute was founded
in the same general policy which excluded the parties themselves from
being witnesses, or any one who had the remotest interest in the result;
a practice which, after being tested and tried for several centuries, has
been deliberately abandoned, both in England and in this country; a
change which, so far from producing any injurious results, has aided
the administration of justice.
"Great apprehensions," says Lord MACKENZIE, in his recent work
upon the Roman Law, p. 331, 2d ed., "were entertained that these
changes might open the door to perjury, but experience has demonstrated that the latitude allowed under the new system, all objection to
credit being duly weighed, is on the whole highly beneficial, by enabling
courts of law to reach the truth in a multitude of cases where the ends
of justice were formerly defeated by excluding the testimony of the
parties best acquainted with the facts in dispute."
Very possibly some such considerations as those I have suggested
led a judge so recent and so experienced as Lqrd CAMPBELL to declare,
it is said, that it would be better if the provision respecting sales were
abolished; to which may be added the remark of Lord MANSFIELD long
ago, that the principles and rules of the common law.as developed and
applied were calculated to attain every end sought by the statute
against frauds: 6aJudyan v. Kennett, Cowp. 432; and the observation
of COKE that in his long career he had known of but two questions
occurring upon the right of descent by the common law; that the
greatest questions arise not upon its rules or principles, but upon conveyances, wills, or instruments drawn by the unlearned or upon statutes:
Co. Rep. preface to Part II. The enactment in the statute respecting
sales may be a salutary one to protect men from having claims established
against them by false testimony or the proof of which rests only in
human memory, and it may be said is, as a public regulation, productive
of no especial injustice where the omission to put the agreement in
writing is attended by no other effect than the failure to get the profit
or advantage that was anticipated from the sale. But if it is the understanding of both parties that an article is to be produced in whole or in
a material degree by the work and labor of one of them, which would
not at that time have been bestowed but for their agreement; then the
refusal of the other party to take the article and pay for it when it is
made is not merely a failure on the part of him that produced it to get
the anticipated benefit, but it may subject him to a direct and absolute
loss by the article being thrown upon his hands.. Any rule of law or
any rule of construction that will sanction this.is unjust in its operation,
and the public considerations upon which the statute was founded do
not demand that it should be carried to this extent. It has required
only contracts of sale to be in writing, and where work and labor has
entered in any material degree into the creation of the thing bargained
for so as to make it doubtful whether it is a contract of sale or not,
courts are not called upon to find nice distinctions, or resort to rigid rules
of interpretation that it may be brought within the operation of the
statute, and declared void because it is not in writing.
Jus summumn sepe est malitia" is the observation of the Latin poet,
and we are told by COKE that the poets are cited as authorities in
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expounding the law: Authoritates philosophorum medicorum et poetarun sunt in causis allegandw et tenendw, Co. Lit. 264.
I have gone into this extended examination for the reason that the
case now before us is a peculiar and a close one as the statute is now
interpreted.
The plaintiffs were manufacturers of an article known as "warps,"
and the defendants of "market nets," an article in the fabrication of
which it would seem warps were used.
On the 25th of March 1867, the defendants wrote to the plaintiffs
that the latter might fill an order for warps and repeated orders for
them, if they could do so upon the terms upon which all warps had been
furnished to the defendants for the preceding three years and at the
lowest market price, and that the defendants would pay for all the warps
purchased in one month at the end of the following month.
The next day the plaintiffs answered by letter that they would make 100
warps for the defendant at 70 cents per pound upon the terms proposed,
cash at the end of the month following the month of delivering, to which
the defendants replied by letter that they did not know their immediate
wants, bat said, "Meantime we. wish you to acrept an order for 50
warps instead of 100 at the price of 70 cents, and if cotton (the moment
this order is filled) is no lower, you will have our order for the 50 more."
Within two days after the receipt of this letter, the plaintiff mailed
their reply addressed to the defendants, advising them that the plaintiffs
accepted the order for %he 50 warps at 70 cents, and would agree to
deliver, another 50, if cotton were do higher nor lower at the expiration
of the delivery of the first fifty; which letter having been duly mailed
to the defendants was sufficient notice of an acceptance on the part of
the plaintiffs of the order for 50 warps: Vasar v. Camp, 11 N. Y. Rep.
441; .Martin v. Frith, 6 Wend. 106. Twelve of the warps were deli.
vered during the months of March and April, having been sent for by
the defendants' superintendent, and were paid for by the defendants.
The remaining thirty-eight were finished, and the plaintiffs requested the
superintendent to receive them, but he did not.
The plaintiffs they advised the defendants by letter on the 30th of
April 1867 that the thirty-eight had been finished some time; that the
superintendent had been requested to receive them but did not, and that
the plaintiffs would send them to the defendants' factory on a specified
day or sooner if requested, to which the defendants replied by letter in
these words :"We beg leave to say that we accept no warps which you have made
without order and contrary to any statement of ours. When we want
warps we order them or send for them, and when we don't order them,
and when the price of cotton upon which any order was based as a price
is so much lowered, the case is altered; and, too, the manufacture of nets
for the present has long since since ceased with us. Warps concerning
which you are so anxious to sell were not made for us any more than
for any other manufacturer, and we have authorized no manufacturer to
pile up warps for us, but that as we wanted them we would order."
The disingenuousness of this reply is apparent. The letter itself
very clearly discloses that the reason why they did not wish to take
them was, that they had no immediate use for them; that they had
stopped the manufacture of nets, and that when they resumed it, they
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could, in consequence of the fall in the price of cotton, get their warps
made at a cheaper rate.
The day after the receipt of this letter the plaintiffs sent the 38
warps in a wagon to the defendants' mills in Paterson, New Jersey, and
tendered them to the defendants' superintendent, who replied that hi,
instructions from Mr. Hoffman were not to receive them.
Twenty days after the president of the plaintiffs' company called upon
the defendant 3Mr. Hoffman, and informed him that the plaintiffs had
the balance of his order, 38 warps, and requested him to receive them,
which he declined, saying that he had not ordered them.
They were then worth about 63 cents a pound.
The plaintiffs waited until the 19th of June 1867, when they advised
the defendants by letter that they had sent the 38 warps to an auctioneer in this city, to be sold at auction, informing the defendants of the
place and of the day and hour of the sale, and that they would hold
them responsible for the difference between the contract price and the
price they might bring. They were accordingly sold at auction at the
time and place named for 43 cents a pound, the sale having been
duly advertised, and a large number of persons being present. The
contract price for the thirty-eight sold was $1064. They brought at the
auction sale $617.39, making a difference of $446.61, whichf amount
the plaintiffs have recovered in this action.
The defendants' superintendent testified that the warps were such as
the plaintiff generally manufactured and had oi hand.
Mr. Ridgway, the president of the plaintiffs' company, testified that
he did not know whether they had any.warps on hand when the
first letter was received from the defendants, nor could he tell how many
they had on hand during the subsequent correspondence; that they were
manufacturing similar warps for other persons at the same time; that
they were coming off continually every half hour as they were manufacturing this class of goods all the while; that he could not say that
they were ready all the time to deliver the wh ole of them; that whenever a demand was made they were ready to fill the order; but I do not
understand by this remark that they were ready to fill the order for the
fifty warps when it was received, but that they were ready to supply the
defendants as they wanted them, for the defendants' superintendent
testified that the plaintiffs' superintendent came to the defendants' mills
and said, "our folks and your folks have made an agreement about
warps," and that he, the defendants' superintendent, was to receive the
warps as and when he wanted them, and he swore that he sentfor six warps
at a time; that he sent twice and received six warps each time. Mr.
Hoffman, the defendant, having told him that iewas to go to the plaintiffs and get warps when he wanted them.
Mr. Ridgway, the president, also testified that the cotton was not
bought for the defendant nor the yarn in the spool made for them particularly; that the plaintiffs were in the habit of manufacturing this
kind of warp; that they seldom kept them on hand and had frequent
orders for them i; that they were not standard articles; that there was
no market price for such warps at the time of the sale, and that they
are an article not usually sold at auction, the witness never having seen
any sold in that way except in this instance.
I think this must be regarded as an agreement between tha plaintiffs
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and the defendants for the manufacture of the fifty warps, and that it
was not a contract of sale within the meaning of the statute. It has
several distinguishing features. In the first place the article is one of
a peculiar kind. In the next place the number contracted for was to
be produced and delivered as the defendants wanted them. In the third,
it is a fair presumption from the evidence that they were all manufactured after the order for them was accepted. Wilson, the defendants'
superintendent, said they were such as the plaintiffs generally manufactured and had on hand.
Ridgway, the president, could not say whether they had usually
warps of this description on hand from the time that the contract was
made and the residue of the warps was ready for delivery, but left it to
be inferred that they had not, by the statement that it was the spring
of the year which he declared was generally a busy time with the plaintiffs, and the testimony of the plaintiffs' superintendent is explicit upon
this point, for he swears that the plaintiffs did not in the busy season
have these warps on hand. He was the one who would necessarily
know, and his statements must be regarded as decisive, there being
nothing to impeach it in the testimony of the plaintifs or in the loose general statements of the defendants' superintendent. In the fourth place,
the evidence warrants the conclusion that the agreeme nt contemplated
that the warps were to be of the plaintiffs' manufacture. This I think is
indicated sufficiently by a passage in the very letter in which the order is
given by the defendants for the fifty warps and the promise held out of
a further order for fifty more, which passage is in these words at the end
of the letter:--4 Finding your warps unifohm, we shall be faithful to
you," which brings the case within the distinction relied upon in RighM
v. Ri[tey, supra, that it is the labor and skill of the person to whom
the order is given, combined with the material that is contracted for
and to which the other party is entitled, and which distinguishes it from
Gardner v. Joy, in which, to quote from the work of Mr. Browne, it
was clearly no part of the bargain that the vendor should manufacture
the candles: Browne on the Statute of Frauds, § 308, 3d ed. And
lastly. Between the time when the order was. accepted-the 29th of
March 1867-and the 30th of April 1867, when the defendants were advised by letter that the "balance of the order had been finished some
time," there was a rapid depreciation in the value of the article, cotton
having fallen, during the months of March and April, from 85 to 65
cents a pound, and afterwards down to 60 cents, a point reached on the
21st of June 1867, in view of which it might be that the plaintiffs
would not have made those fifty warps at that time but for the fact that
they had an order from the defendants to manufacture that specific
quantity at a specific price.
Though I do not regard this as a contract of sale, and think that our
decision should be put upon that ground as the proper disposition of the
case, still, if it were necessary to hold it to be a contract of that description within the meaning of the statute, the judgment entered upon the
report of the referee would still be correct.
It may be doubtful if there was sufficient proof of a memorandum in
writing of the contract subscribed by the parties to be charged : 2 Rev.
Stat. 140, § 3. It is not necessary that it should be comprised in one
paper. It may be embraced in several, but they must be connected
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with and refer to each other, and the mutual relations of the writings
must appear upon their face, and cannot be established by parol evidence, it being the policy of the statute to take the eases enumerated
entirely out of the reach of verbal testimony: Wright v. Meeks, 25 N.
Y. 153; Stocker v. Partridge,2 Robt. S. 0. 193; Greenl. on Ev. § 268;
Browne on the Statute of Frauds 346, 3d ed and cases there cited.
In the case before us, the defendants' leter was simply a proposal
that the plaintiffs should accept an order for fifty warps, instead of
one hundred, at the price of seventy cents.
This was the exact language used, and the existence of a contract or
not depended on the acceptance of the order upon the terms proposed.
The acceptance was by letter, but the contents of this letter, as well
as the fact that it was mailed to the defendants, was established by parol
evidence.
No exception was taken to the proof, and as the letter is presumed to
have reached the defendants in due course of mail and might have been
produced by them before the referee, it may be that this was sufficient
proof of an acceptance in writing: Watts v. Anisumt, 6 L. T. N. S.
252. But if there be doubt on this point, there was sufficient evidence
of a delivery an'd acceptance of a part of the warps to take the case
out of the operation of the statute. The agreement was an entirety.
It was for fifty warps at a fixed price.
This appears by the letter in which the order was given, and l y the
plaintiffs' letter of acceptance, and when the latter letter, addressed to
the defendants in New York, was mailed to them by the plaintiffs at
Paterson, in New Jersey, the contract was complete: Vassar v. Camp,
11 N. Y. 411, and cases there cited.
The correspondence did not designate when the warps were to be
delivered, but it appears by the testimony of Ridgway, King and Wilson, that they were to be delivered as the defendants' superintendent
wanted them, and whether that were so or not 'the delivery and acceptance of a portion of them was sufficient to take the case out of the statute.
It is not essential under our statute that the i delivery and acceptance
of a part of the goods should take place at the time of the making of
the contract, but the delivery and acceptance of a part afterwards will
suffice: Sale v. Darragh,2 Hilton 201, 202; lfcKnight v. Dunlap, 1
Seld. 537; Sprague v. Blake, 20 Wend. 61.
Twelve of the warps were delivered to the defendants' superintendent,
who swore that he was instructed by the defendants to go and get the
warps when he wanted them. He sent twice to the plaintiffs, each time
for six, and they were delivered to him; and to put at rest all question
of the delivery and acceptance of a portion df the quantity ordered,
the defendants paid for these twelve warps by their checks on the 29th
of April, and on the 22d or 23d of May following: Outweiler v. Dodge,
6 Wend. 397.
The remaining cestions in the case may be summarily disposed of.
The defendants having refused to accept and pay for the residue of
the warps, the plaintiffs had the right to sell them and hold the defendants for the deficiency: Smede v. Taylor, 5 Johns. 395. They gave
the defendants notice of the time and place of sale, although strictly
even this was not necessary: Lewis v. Gurder,49 Barb. 605.
The sale was by public auction, which, as a general rule, is the appro-

